recognition and memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective." While her graduate research straddled both high level vision and long term memory the next phase of her career was more focused on recognition memory. Dr. Aminoff was a postdoctoral scholar at the University of California, Santa Barbara where she collaborated with Army Research Labs to examine individual differences in both the psychological and neural mechanisms of recognition memory. Soon it became apparent that she missed doing research in high level vision and went on to be a research scientist at Carnegie Mellon University where Dr. Aminoff studied the contextual associations in scene understanding. In this position Dr. Aminoff collaborated with computer vision scientists to examine how artificial models of vision could help reveal the neural mechanisms in human scene perception. From her position at Carnegie Mellon University, Dr. Aminoff moved to NYC to join the faculty at Fordham University where she continues to examine how contextual associations can affect both how one sees and understands visual scenes, and furthermore, how contextual associations can affect how one remembers past events. Dr. Aminoff uses wide range of tools including neuroimaging methods (fMRI, EEG, ECoG, MEG), computational models, and behavioral and psychophysical methods to examine these questions. Abstract Revolution or the new phrenology-the advent of functional neuroimaging has led some psychologists to address issues of structure-function relations that only two decades ago would have been relegated to science fiction. Others, however, are skeptical of recent bridges between psychological and biological science and consider these advances as misguided and leading us astray. With any new advancement comes problems and pitfalls, and constructive criticisms help to sharpen the research program. Here I offer commentary on the state of the art and identify both advances and concerns in bridging psychological and biological science.
The 1990s was proclaimed by the Library of Congress and National Institute of Mental Health as the ''Decade of the Brain.'' In 1994, the Cognitive Neuroscience Society was founded by a group of scientists interested in bridging psychological and biological science. Just as the mid-20th century has been viewed as the era of the cognitive revolution (Gardner, 1985; George Miller, 2003) , I am convinced that the 1990s will be viewed as the beginning of the cognitive neuroscience revolution. Mid-century cognitive psychologists revolted against the tyranny of behaviorism and considered mindful events, whereas cognitive neuroscientists revolted against insular views of the mind and considered brain activity.
Attempts at bridging psychological and biological science over the past two decades have certainly advanced our understanding of the mind and behavior. Of course, every science is fraught with ill-conceived motivations, poorly designed experiments, and overzealous claims, and cognitive neuroscience has its share of errant contributors. In this issue, Gregory Miller (2010, this issue) admonishes both scientists and science writers about the dangers of faulty inferences and inaccurate phraseology (see also Beck, 2010, this issue) . Poldrack (2010, this issue) offers an analytic approach that attempts to dissuade us from naive attempts at localizing complex psychological phenomenon to rather circumscribed neural tissue, and, similarly, Gonsalves and Cohen (2010, this issue) highlight the benefits attained by careful analysis of functional neuroimaging data.
The cognitive neuroscience revolution is most significantly marked by advances in functional neuroimaging, particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which has been an incredibly accessible and exciting means of relating brain activity to psychological function. Colorful brain images and colorful claims about the neural underpinnings of psychological function have been presented in both scientific journals and in the popular press. The excitement and popularity of neuroimaging research has led appropriately to criticisms about claims made by the field's most ardent advocates. Indeed, it has frequently been suggested that the cognitive neuroscience revolution is instead the new phrenology (see Uttal, 2001) . Such criticisms need to be addressed with the hope that they can be resolved and advance the field. I believe that most critics of the field appreciate that there is worth in bridging psychological and biological science, yet conceptual blunders must be avoided. With these points in mind, I describe briefly the good, bad, and ugly of the approach. attributed to rather circumscribed brain regions, such as the fusiform gyrus, hippocampus, or amygdala. Such one-to-one mappings of function to structure is certainly simplistic and should be avoided. Miller's point echoes those of Dennett (1995) who described the problem of greedy reductionism: ''But in their eagerness for a bargain, in their zeal to explain too much too fast, scientists and philosophers often underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers or levels of theory in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the foundation' ' (Dennett, 1995, p. 82) .
In psychological science, issues of naive reductionism are interwoven with issues of naive localizationism. Long before the advent of fMRI, Alexander Luria, the noted neurologist, warned us against a ''narrow ''localizationist view in which one uses data from brain-injured patients to map specific disorders onto specific brain regions (Luria, 1973) . Thus, Broca's aphasia should not be attributed simplistically to Broca's area. Naive localizationist views harken to the view of the phrenologists and thus encourage critics to make comparisons between those who linked bumps on the head to psychological functions to those who link bright spots on neuroimaging scans to psychological functions. Luria, however, was a reductionist and argued for a more sophisticated analysis of the neural circuits or systems involved in complex psychological functions. By analogy, the heart is an essential component of the circulatory system, but it is not the only structure involved in this system. Clearly, a full explanation of mindful events requires a consideration of broad neural circuits and the interaction of many neural processes. Yet these points do not belie the fact that there is some degree of functional localization in the brain. Indeed, damage to certain brain regions can reliably cause rather discrete problems in psychological function, including problems in language, memory, and emotional regulation. In neuroimaging studies, mindful events are often reliably correlated with activity in specific brain regions. Thus, it is important to consider a more sophisticated view of neuroimaging and neuropsychological findings that involves the identification of neural mechanisms contributing to psychological function (for an attempt to overcome narrow localizationist views in the analysis of episodic memory, see Shimamura, in press) .
With respect to reductionism, Gregory Miller does not suggest any direction to follow. In fact, he never explicates what a nonnaive reductionist view would look like. He even rejects views that consider psychological functions as highly complex, though in principle reducible to brain activity. If one rejects such a view, one harbors very close to a mentalist view, which argues that there is something unique about the mind that cannot be explained by matter (i.e., the brain). I suspect that most scientists adopt a materialist view, in which only matter exists, and thus it is essentially the brain (or the body taken as a whole) that gives us the experience of psychological events, such as thoughts, feelings, and memories. From a materialist view, it is assumed that brain activity does underlie these mindful events, and thus the usage of such phrases as neural underpinnings, neural basis, or underlying biological substrate is perfectly reasonable. Of course, one's behavior or psychological experience can influence biological processes, as we often engage in a number of behaviors, such as overeating, overdrinking, excessive fear, and exercise, that could influence brain processes. Yet these influences are assumed to affect the body and ultimately impinge on later psychological events. Finally, it seems that some critics of the cognitive neuroscience revolution fear that psychological science will be rendered obsolete. Yet I thoroughly agree with Gregory Miller that ''Working out the biology will not make psychology obsolete '' (p. 735) . Basic research in behavioral science is essential in characterizing the nature of psychological events. Indeed, it is only by careful analysis of behavioral tasks that those who use neuroimaging techniques can more succinctly characterize structure-function relations.
What Functional Neuroimaging Can (and Cannot) Do For You
Functional neuroimaging is a correlational method in which neural activity is linked to psychological events. Thus, one could assess the neural correlates of such psychological phenomena as fear, remembering, or daydreaming. Such analyses would indicate where and perhaps when brain activity occurs when confronted with a mindful event. Unless one induces neural activity and observes psychological or behavioral consequences, as is done in animal models using electrical stimulation or in humans using transcranial magnetic stimulation, one is left with correlative data that link regional activity to psychological processes. Yet the analysis of correlative data has been extremely valuable in both psychological and biological arenas. Virtually all human aging studies and studies of clinical pathologies (e.g., depression, schizophrenia) are correlational in that the primary interest centers on an analysis of a subject variable. A psychologist cannot randomly place a subject in a 70-year-old group or a schizophrenia group. Despite this restriction, such correlational analyses have been extremely useful and have advanced our understanding of psychological phenomena.
We have learned in introductory psychology courses that a correlation does not imply a causal relationship. As important as this homily is, it does not mean that scientists should ignore the possibility of a causal relation between two correlated variables. Many would argue that smoking causes lung cancer in humans, yet tobacco companies are correct in stating that there is no scientific evidence demonstrating a causal link between smoking and lung cancer in humans. Clearly, it would be unethical to consider such an empirical investigation, which would include a long-term study involving randomized groups, in which one group is forced to smoke for an extended period. Yet strong correlations between smoking behavior and lung cancer have been observed, and animal models have demonstrated causal links between the two. Such findings, taken together, offer important evidence to conclude that smoking causes cancer. Similarly, one could observe in an fMRI study an area in the brain in which activity is reliably correlated with a mental event, such as remembering. Such findings, along with lesion studies in animal models and neuropsychological studies of memory impairment in patients, could be convincing evidence to suggest that the brain area contributes to remembering in a causal fashion, though of course not in a narrow localizationist manner. When Gregory Miller states that ''To date, no fully developed demonstration of a mechanism by which psychology or biology affects the other has been offered' ' (p. 716) , he seems precariously close to making the same kind of assertions that tobacco companies make about their products.
At the moment, there are three general methodologies used in functional neuroimaging. The first and most widely used method is the (usually pairwise) comparison of conditions within a task. For example, in an fMRI study, one might assess brain regions as being active when a subject recognizes a test item as ''old'' compared with trials when the subject identifies an item as ''new.'' In this subtractive method, one can assess the neural correlates associated with one condition (i.e., remembering) in comparison with another baseline condition (i.e., not remembering). Most functional neuroimaging studies assess such within-task activations. A second method is to consider cross-task or cross-function analyses in which two very different tasks are presented during the same scanning session to determine the degree of overlap in activity between the tasks (see Cabeza et al., 2003) . This method is also considered by Poldrack in his analysis of various tasks that might activate the same brain region. Cross-task analyses highlight more complex structure-function relations as two diverse mental events might activate the same brain region. In such instances, one cannot claim a simple one-to-one mapping between structure and function. A third method involves functional connectivity analyses in which multivariate models are used to address activity across large-scale neural networks (see Rogers, Morgan, Newton, & Gore, 2007) . All of these methods are correlative in nature, though each offers important clues to the biological bases of psychological processes.
Cognitive Neuroscience: ''What?'', ''Where?'', and ''How?" Poldrack (this issue) identifies ''where'' and ''what'' strategies when conducting neuroimaging research. I would like to suggest a broader usage of these questions as they are important for cognitive neuroscience and thus critical in bridging psychological and biological approaches. When one asks a ''What?"-question, such as ''What is remembering?'' or ''What is depression?'', it is essential to describe mental events in terms of psychological processes and how they are affected by task variables. Experimental psychologists, sans neuroscience, focus on such ''What?'' questions. Indeed, the cognitive revolution demonstrated how information processing approaches could help in describing psychological phenomena (see Gardner, 1985) . Even today, it is common and useful to refer to psychological concepts such as executive control or bottomup processes when describing psychological phenomena. As mentioned above, it is certainly a worthy enterprise to conduct behavioral analyses that describe the nature of psychological events without referring to brain processes. Indeed, one could still be a materialist but nevertheless solely be interested in psychological conditions or variables that influence behavior.
"Where?'' questions attempt to define the neural correlates of psychological phenomena. Such questions address the neural underpinnings of psychological phenomena, as it is assumed that brain activity is the basis for psychological events. Functional neuroimaging studies, as well as studies of brain-injured cases, address the ''Where?'' question. As such, these studies help define brain regions that contribute to psychological events. It is important to note that the psychological tasks used to study ''Where?'' questions are critical, and thus analyses of brain-oriented issues depend upon knowledge gained from addressing ''What?'' questions. In other words, worthy functional neuroimaging findings are based on careful descriptions and behavioral indices of psychological phenomena.
Unfortunately, many cognitive neuroscientists consider the endpoint of their endeavor as discovering where brain activations occur for a particular psychological event. That is, one might say, ''I have found the brain region that is most highly active during a fear-induced condition.'' As important as this finding is, cognitive neuroscience must go further in characterizing the neural mechanisms or circuits that underlie particular structure-function relations. In other words, theories must address ''How?'' questions: ''How does a brain region contribute to a fear response?'', ''How does the hippocampus contribute to remembering?'', etc. Without addressing ''How?'' questions, the field is subject to criticisms of naive reductionism and narrow localizationism. To answer ''How?'' questions, it is necessary to consider broader neural circuits and develop theoretical frameworks that might even encompass wholebrain interactions. To go beyond ''What?'' and ''Where?'' questions, it is often necessary to consider computational models that define how neural circuits operate.
Some have criticized functional neuroimaging for failing to contribute anything new to our understanding of psychological phenomena. Some suggest that neuroimaging studies have only replicated or confirmed what has already been discovered by animal models or studies of brain-injured cases. It would be rather disturbing if neuroimaging data did not confirm extant findings of structure-function relations. Indeed, the fact that neuroimaging studies have often corroborated findings from animal and neuropsychological studies provides further evidence for causal links between brain activity and psychological phenomena. Despite these criticisms, neuroimaging investigations have provided new and important scientific discoveries. As Gonsalves and Cohen assert, the importance of the posterior parietal cortex in episodic retrieval is a finding that was discovered only by functional neuroimaging research. The role of the anterior cingulate gyrus in conflict monitoring is another prime example (see Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) . When considering criticisms of the field, it is hoped that most everyone believes that there has been progress and that at least the cup is filling up and may even be half full. Criticisms that pertain to overzealous inferences in data interpretation or suggestions Introduction When I began graduate school for cognitive psychology in 1989, I was unaware of the ongoing race to develop functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). It may come as no surprise to those who know my writings that when I first encountered imaging studies as a graduate student, I was highly skeptical that it could inform us about mental function. I was, in this sense, in good company; in those days, it was not uncommon to hear conversations between cognitive psychologists likening fMRI to trying to understand how an engine works by measuring the temperature of the exhaust manifold. When I moved to Stanford in 1995 to start my postdoc, I didn't actually go there to do fMRI, but circumstances led me to get involved in the imaging work that was ongoing in John Gabrieli's lab, and my career as a neuroimager was born.
My thoughts below about the future of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience would be better characterized as hopes rather than predictions. Despite what I see as serious fundamental problems in how fMRI has been and continues to be used in cognitive neuroscience, I think that the last few years have witnessed a number of encouraging new developments, and I remain very hopeful that fMRI will continue to provide us with useful insights into the relation between mind and brain. In the foregoing, I outline what I see as the the most promising new directions for fMRI in cognitive neuroscience, with an obvious bias towards the some of directions that my own research is currently taking.
Methodological rigor
Foremost, I hope that in the next 20 years the field of cognitive neuroscience will increase the rigor with which it applies neuroimaging methods. The recent debates about circularity and "voodoo correlations" (Kriegeskorte et al., in press; Vul et al., 2009) Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect NeuroImage j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / y n i m g (Ioannidis, 2005) to outline a number of factors that may contribute to increased levels of spurious results in any scientific field, and the degree to which many of these apply to fMRI research is rather sobering:
• small sample sizes • small effect sizes • large number of tested effects • flexibilty in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analysis methods • being a "hot" scientific field Some simple methodological improvements could make a big difference. First, the field needs to agree that inference based on uncorrected statistical results is not acceptable (cf. Bennett et al., 2009 ). Many researchers have digested this important fact, but it is still common to see results presented at thresholds such as uncorrected p b .005. Because such uncorrected thresholds do not adapt to the data (e.g., the number of voxels tests or their spatial smoothness), they are certain to be invalid in almost every situation (potentially being either overly liberal or overly conservative). As an example, I took the fMRI data from Tom et al. (2007) , and created a random "individual difference" variable. Thus, there should be no correlations observed other than Type I errors. However, thresholding at uncorrected p b .001 and a minimum cluster size of 25 voxels (a common heuristic threshold) showed a significant region near the amygdala; Fig. 1 shows this region along with a plot of the "beautiful" (but artifactual) correlation between activation and the random behavioral variable. This activation was not present when using a corrected statistic. A similar point was made in a more humorous way by Bennett et al. (2010) , who scanned a dead salmon being presented with a social cognition task and found activation when using an uncorrected threshold. There are now a number of wellestablished methods for multiple comparisons correction , such that there is absolutely no excuse to present results at uncorrected thresholds. The most common reason for failing to use rigorous corrections for multiple tests is that with smaller samples these methods are highly conservative, and thus result in a high rate of false negatives. This is certainly a problem, but I don't think that the answer is to present uncorrected results; rather, the answer is to ensure that one's sample is large enough to provide sufficient statistical power to find the effects of interest.
Second, I have become increasingly concerned about the use of "small volume corrections" to address the multiple testing problem. The use of a priori masks to constrain statistical testing is perfectly legitimate, but one often gets the feeling that the masks used for small volume correction were chosen after seeing the initial results (perhaps after a whole-brain corrected analysis was not significant). In such a case, any inferences based on these corrections are circular and the statistics are useless. Researchers who plan to use small volume corrections in their analysis should formulate a specific analysis plan prior to any analyses, and only use small volume corrections that were explicitly planned a priori. This sounds like a remedial lesson in basic statistics, but unfortunately it seems to be regularly forgotten by researchers in the field.
Third, the field needs to move toward the use of more robust methods for statistical inference (e.g., Huber, 2004) . In particular, analyses of correlations between activation and behavior across subjects are highly susceptible to the influence of outlier subjects, especially with small sample sizes. Robust statistical methods can ensure that the results are not overly influenced by these outliers, either by reducing the effect of outlier datapoints (e.g., robust regression using iteratively reweighted least squares) or by separately modeling data points that fall too far outside of the rest of the sample (e.g., mixture modeling). Robust tools for fMRI group analysis are increasingly available, both as part of standard software packages (such as the "outlier detection" technique implemented in FSL: Woolrich, 2008 ) and as add-on toolboxes (Wager et al., 2005) . Given the frequency with which outliers are observed in group fMRI data, these methods should become standard in the field. However, it's also important to remember that they are not a panacea, and that it remains important to apply sufficient quality control to statistical results, in order to understand the degree to which one's results reflect generalizeable patterns versus statistical figments.
From blobology to pattern analysis
The foregoing methodological issues have taken on particular importance due to the strong focus of the field on localization of function; the goal of finding blobs in a specific region can drive researchers into analytic gymnastics in order to find a significant blob to report. However, for the last few years the most interesting and novel research has focused on understanding patterns of activation rather than localized blobs. The appreciation of patterns is happening at multiple scales. At the systems (whole-brain) scale, the modeling of connectivity and its relation to behavior continue to grow. One impediment to the analysis of connectivity with fMRI is the lack of a 001, voxelwise uncorrected, 25 voxel extent threshold) for the correlation between activation and a randomly generated variable. The right plot shows the correlation between activation in the peak voxel from the map and the randomly generated variable, showing that completely spurious data can produce seemingly compelling results when heuristic corrections are combined with circular data analysis.
standardized set of approaches for connectivity modeling; with so many different approaches being used across the field, it can be difficult to understand how the results relate to one another. The recent work by Smith et al. (2011) examining the relative power of different modeling approaches using simulated data is a good start toward better understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of these different methods, and I envision that these kinds of methodological "shoot-outs" will eventually help determine which methods are most optimal for which questions. I think that the jury is still out on how well fMRI can ever characterize neuronal connectivity; as we outlined in Ramsey et al. (2010) , there are a number of fundamental challenges in using fMRI to characterize causal interactions between brain regions. Further work combining neurophysiology and fMRI (e.g., David et al., 2008) will be essential to fully understand the potential and limitations of fMRI for modeling of the underlying neuronal connectivity. At a more local level, the use of analyses that focus on patterns of activation over a region rather than mean activation in that region has become very popular in the last few years (e.g., Kriegeskorte et al., 2006 Kriegeskorte et al., , 2008 Norman et al., 2006) , and I expect that this will continue. It is now clear that information can be coded in fMRI data either through local changes in mean activation or through changes in local patterns of activity, and that analysis of only the mean activation (which has been the standard over the last 20 years) may be missing a significant part of the picture. For example, we recently compared results from closely-matched univariate and multivariate (patterninformation) analyses for a decision-making task, and found many regions in the cortex where the multivariate test was significantly more sensitive to task-relevant information than the univariate analysis, with a smaller set of regions showing the opposite pattern (Jimura and Poldrack, in press ). I think that one approach that has particularly strong appeal is representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) , in which the patterns of activity in fMRI data are related to behaviorally-relevant variables such as stimulus features or task manipulations. For example, we (Xue et al., 2010) recently used this approach to show that memory is better for items whose patterns of activity are more similar across study episodes, which has implications for cognitive theories of memory. I think that this approach has great potential to provide much stronger links from neuroimaging data to cognitive theories (which often make detailed predictions about patterns across stimuli) and computational models, which will help provide a stronger basis for relating brain activity and mental function.
Selective inference
Neuroimaging as it is used by most cognitive neuroscientists faces a fundamental problem, which is evident from even a cursory reading of the literature: Within different subfields in cognitive neuroscience, very different functions can be assigned to the same structure. The anterior cingulate may be the poster child for this heterogeneity, with proposed functions as various as conflict monitoring, interoception, pain, autonomic regulation, effort, and consciousness. This becomes particularly problematic when researchers are aware of only one of those literatures and attempt to make reverse inferences based on activation in a region (e.g., "the anterior cingulate is active, thus the subject must be experiencing conflict") (Poldrack, 2006) .
If the goal of cognitive neuroscience is to map function onto structure, then this is a serious problem, and the standard approach to neuroimaging does not provide any way to solve it. How can we identify what the basic function is that a region or network subserves? As I argued recently (Poldrack, 2010) , I think that the answer is to move toward methods that allow us to identify selective associations between functions and structures. This requires that we ask not simply whether we can find a region that is engaged by a particular mental process, but whether one can find a region that is engaged selectively, such that activation of the region is actually predictive of the mental process. The tools from machine learning that have recently been brought to bear on fMRI data (Norman et al., 2006; Pereira et al., 2009; Poldrack et al., 2009) can provide important leverage on this issue, by providing a principled way to assess the predictive power of activation and thus allowing a quantitative assessment of the strength of any reverse inference (Poldrack, 2008) .
In addition to these tools, however, we need data sets that are broad enough to allow the assessment of any particular function against many other functions in order to assess selectivity and understand the larger-scale structure of mind-brain relationships. To date, the only databases large enough to support such meta-analysis are based on activation coordinates mined from papers, an approach pioneered by the BrainMap group (Laird et al., 2005) . We (Yarkoni et al., in press ) have recently developed a coordinate-based database (http://www.neurosynth.org) that allows mining of full text in relation to brain activation. This allows the creation of maps reflecting the power of "forward inference" (i.e., inferring the presence of activation in each voxel given the presence of a particular term in the paper) and "reverse inference" (i.e., inferring the presence of a term in the paper given activation in a voxel). The striking insight to come from analyses of this database (Yarkoni et al., in press ) is that some regions (e.g., anterior cingulate) can show high degrees of activation in forward inference maps, yet be of almost no use for reverse inference due to their very high base rates of activation across studies (e.g., some voxels in the anterior cingulate are active in more than 25% of papers). Tools like this, which combine text mining with neuroimaging data, have the potential to increase our understanding of selective associations between mental function and brain activity.
Open science and data aggregation
The need to integrate information across many different task paradigms and psychological domains highlights the critical role of effective data sharing across research groups, as it would be exceedingly difficult for an individual research group to collect the large amounts of data needed for such analyses. While the coordinate-based meta-analytic approaches mentioned above will be useful for many questions, they will undoubtedly fall short in some cases, leading to a need for the analysis of raw fMRI data. When the fMRI Data Center (fMRIDC) was started in 2001 with the goal of sharing raw fMRI data (Van Horn et al., 2001) , there was widespread skepticism and opposition regarding the utility of data sharing. Although there were certainly some missteps in the execution of the fMRIDC project, this reaction largely reflected the fact that the project was ahead of its time, and there was a lack of a social consensus in favor of data sharing. A number of developments suggest that this has changed, such that the field is now ready for large-scale data aggregation. First, there is an incipient "open science" revolution in scientific publishing, examples of which can be seen in the Frontiers and Public Library of Science (PLOS) journals. In parallel, there is growing interest across science in the value of open access to large datasets. The powerful insights that have arisen from data sharing in other fields (such as genomics, where every genome sequenceis shared via GenBank) have provided additional proof of concept for the power of large shared databases. Together, these developments suggest the possibility of large-scale effective data sharing in the future. Groups such as the Science Commons (http://sciencecommons.org/) are developing new models for open access to publications, data, and scientific tools. These efforts have been heavily inspired by the open source software movement, which has demonstrated the effectiveness of "crowdsourcing" (Doan et al., 2011) .
The recent development and publication of large-scale resting state fMRI datasets by the 1000 Functional Connectomes Project (FCP) and International Neuroimaging Data Initiative (INDI) have demonstrated the feasibility of sharing large fMRI datasets in a free and open manner (Biswal et al., 2010) . However, sharing of task fMRI data remains much more challenging due to the need for additional metadata describing the task. We have recently begun to address this challenge via the OpenfMRI Project (http://www.openfmri.org). Although currently very small in comparison to other databases such as FCP/INDI, this project has developed a framework for the representation of task-based fMRI metadata that should make the sharing of these data significantly easier. As tools for data sharing are developed and integrated with tools for data analysis (i.e., a "submit" button within the software package that would automatically upload the data to a shared database), I hope that we will see that sharing of fMRI data will become increasingly common. I hope that as such databases grow, they will provide a unique resource for testing the power of reverse inference across a much larger set of tasks.
The utility of such large shared datasets also depends on sufficient computing resources to process hundreds or thousands of subjects' worth of fMRI data. The development of high-performance computing clusters based on commodity hardware has begun to provide such resources; for example, using the clusters at the Texas Advanced Computing Center we regularly run jobs that utilize more than 4000 processors, allowing us to complete analyses in minutes that would have previously taken months to finish. As cognitive neuroscience research becomes increasingly reliant on analysis of very large datasets, the use of such high-performance computing systems will become critical, and effective use of these resources will require cognitive neuroscience researchers to interact even more closely with computer scientists and informaticians in order to take the best advantage of them.
Describing mental processes: ontologies and computational models
When cognitive neuroscience researchers use fMRI to map mental processes onto brain structure, the processes that are being mapped are generally described in an informal way in the text of the publication. While this has long been viewed as adequate, it makes the aggregation of hypothesis-relevant data very difficult. In other areas of bioscience such as genomics, the use of ontologies (formal descriptions of terms and their relationships) to annotate data has led to incredible progress in mapping of biological functions onto genetic structure (Bard and Rhee, 2004) , and it is likely that ontologies will play an equally important role for cognitive neuroscience (Bilder et al., 2009; Yarkoni et al., 2010) . If we are to make good use of the data that are shared across research groups, these data will need to be deeply annotated using an ontology of mental function, in order to then ask which proposed associations between mental processes and brain systems are supported across multiple task domains. Development of such ontologies is very challenging because psychologists do not agree about much of the underlying mental architecture; however, capturing both the agreements and disagreements is fundamental if we wish to ultimately use brain imaging to understand the organization of the mind. The Cognitive Atlas project (http://www. cognitiveatlas.org) (Poldrack et al., submitted for publication) has begun to develop such an ontology, which will serve as a basis for annotation in the OpenfMRI.org data sharing project. Other ontologies are being developed to describe the structure of psychological tasks (CogPO: Turner and Laird (in press)) and EEG data (NEMO: http:// nemo.nic.uoregon.edu/wiki/NEMO). The implementation of these ontologies will provide the semantic infrastructure that is needed to maximize the power of shared data. In addition, thinking during the design process about how a specific task manipulation relates to an ontology forces clarity about what the manipulation is measuring, which could be generally useful in driving cleaner and more specific experimental designs.
Mathematical/computational models provide another language for describing the underlying processes being mapped by neuroimaging studies. In some areas of cognitive neuroscience (such as highlevel vision and decision making), such models have already provided valuable insights into the functional organization of the brain. One difficult but important challenge will be to effect a clearer mapping between the functional organization described by ontologies and the computational organization implemented in mathematical models. Within cognitive science, a number of general computational frameworks have been developed for the description of cognitive processes (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Chater et al., 2006; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986) , and models based on these frameworks have been related to brain function (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Norman and O'Reilly, 2003; Schultz et al., 1997) ; in the future, I expect that computational frameworks like these will play an increasingly important role in characterizing the mental operations being mapped using neuroimaging.
Conclusions
fMRI has advanced cognitive neuroscience research in a way that has been nothing short of revolutionary, though at the same time there are fundamental limits to the standard imaging approach that have not been widely appreciated. I am hopeful that 20 years from now, the history of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience will show that the field attacked this problem head on and developed new, robust methods for better understanding the relation between mental processes and brain function. 
INTRODUCTION
Memory for past events is not perfect; it typically involves forgetting, adding to, or distorting details of an actual episode (Loftus, 2003; Schacter, 1999; Bartlett, 1932) . One common type of memory distortion is referred to as ''false recognition'': an incorrect claim to have seen or encountered a novel object or an event Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Underwood, 1965) . We hypothesize that one source for such memory errors is related to the coactivation of contextually related objects in memory.
In everyday life, we do not encounter objects in isolation but rather, they are embedded in a context with other objects that frequently share the same context. For example, when walking into a bedroom, one typically encounters a bed, a dresser, a mirror, and an alarm clock nearby. Similarly, when encountering a cluster of balloons, we often expect a celebratory event that frequently involves gifts, a cake, and candles. Our experience with such typical settings creates in memory collections of contextually associated objects, termed ''context frames'' (Bar, 2004; Bar & Ullman, 1996) . This study examines how the context-based coactivation of such associations, and the corresponding neuronal activity of the context processing regions of the brain, contributes to false recognition of common objects. In other words, whether the exposure to a strong contextual object (e.g., a traffic light) affects our memory such that we later falsely believe that a contextually related object (e.g., parking meter) has been presented previously although it has not. Addressing this question will help to illuminate the cortical mechanisms mediating the phenomenon of false memory, and potentially shed more light on our understanding of the organization of contextual associations in the brain.
Prior studies have shown an increased likelihood of incorrectly recalling an object that is contextually related to an object previously encountered in a scene, compared with an unrelated object. For instance, Brewer and Treyens (1981) left participants in an office for 10 min, after which the participants were moved out of that office to another a room, where a surprise memory recall test was administered. Participants falsely ''recalled'' items that were contextually congruent with an office more often than items that were not contextually congruent. Miller and Gazzaniga (1998) demonstrated similar contextual effects. Participants were shown a series of Norman Rockwell illustrations of typical scenes (e.g., a beach) and were subsequently tested on their memory for the items within the scenes. Participants were more likely to produce false alarms to items that were contextually congruent with the scenes (e.g., a beach ball) compared with items that were unrelated (e.g., a chalkboard).
Both of these previous studies relied on entire scenes to generate false memory. Therefore, in addition to our novel examination of the neural correlates of contextbased false recognition, the present study goes beyond previous reports by investigating the actual mechanism by which individual objects can evoke an activation pattern in which the coactivation of contextual related objects, not present at the time of encoding, can lead to subsequent false recognition.
The neural origins of contextually related false memories are largely unknown. Recent work (Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2007; Bar, 2004; Bar & Aminoff, 2003) has revealed three main cortical areas that mediate contextual processing: the parahippocampal cortex (PHC), the retrosplenial complex (RSC), and a third focus in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) observed under certain task demands (Bar, 2007; Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske, 2007) . Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) across several studies, these regions were found to be selectively activated when participants viewed objects with strong contextual associations (e.g., a traffic light, strongly associated with a street context; or a baby bottle, strongly associated with the context of a baby) compared with objects with weak contextual associations (e.g., a camera, not specifically associated with a particular contextual setting). We concluded that the PHC, the RSC, and the MPFC constitute a network subserving contextual associations (a context network ''localizer'' is available at http://barlab. mgh.harvard.edu/ContextLocalizer.htm). The characterization of a neural system for contextual processing provides a basis for exploring the neural activity associated with contextually related false memories. Specifically, we hypothesize that the coactivation of these contextual associations at the time of encoding is responsible for subsequent false recognition of related contextual objects. To examine the neural origins of such false recognition, we used a subsequent memory paradigm in which neural activity at the time of encoding is related to later remembering or forgetting (Brewer, Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner et al., 1998) . The subsequent memory paradigm was previously applied to false recognition in a study by Gonsalves and Paller (2000) , who used it to examine neural events at encoding associated with perceiving versus imagining an object as a function of true or false recognition on a later test. Using this paradigm allows us to examine encoding activity as a function of later recognition accuracy on an item-by-item basis (Gonsalves & Paller, 2000) . The subsequent memory method has been successfully used in prior work to examine the origins of different types of memory errors, including source monitoring (Gonsalves et al., 2004; Gonsalves & Paller, 2000) , emotional content influences on source monitoring (Kensinger & Schacter, 2005) , and when general information, rather than specific information, is retained in memory (Garoff, Slotnick, & Schacter, 2005) .
Our main hypothesis is that increased activity in the cortical network that subserves contextual processing will be predictive of subsequent false recognition of objects that are contextually related to the presented object. According to this hypothesis, greater activity elicited in the context cortical network would indicate an increased activation of contextually related objects, and this increased activation of contextually related objects would, in turn, lead to increased likelihood of false recognition of these related items.
In the present study, participants were scanned using fMRI during the encoding phase of the experiment. We designed a novel paradigm where two common visual objects were presented simultaneously on each encoding trial, and participants were asked to ''put the two objects together into a context and to press a button based on how many objects they associated with the context'' on a 4-point scale (see Methods). The pairs of objects were of one of two types: either two strong contextual objects that belonged to the same context (e.g., a bulldozer and a construction cone) or two weak contextual objects that were not related to each other (e.g., a camera and a pair of scissors; Figure 1 ). A day after the encoding phase, participants performed, outside of the scanner, an old-new recognition memory test in which they were presented with words depicting objects from one of four types of categories: (1) strong contextual objects that were presented at encoding (e.g., bulldozer; old-strong item); (2) weak contextual objects presented at encoding (e.g., camera; old-weak item); (3) strong contextual objects related to the context presented at encoding, but that did not actually appear at encoding (e.g., crib, with relation to baby bottle and stroller presented at encoding; new-related lure item); and (4) novel objects (both strong and weak contextual) not related to any object or context presented at encoding (e.g., disco ball; new-unrelated baseline).
METHODS Participants
Twenty-five participants were scanned in this experiment. Nine participants were excluded from the analysis based Figure 1 . Experimental design. Participants were scanned while presented with pairs of objects that either had strong contextual associations or weak contextual associations. The following day, participants were tested for their memory with words. Based on their response, encoding trials were defined as trials that led to a hit, miss, false alarm, and correct rejection.
on various criteria (see Data Analysis). The remaining 16 participants consisted of 6 women (15/16 right hand dominant), with a mean age of 26.75 years (SD = 3.67) All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed written consent was obtained from each of the participants prior to the scanning sessions. All procedures were approved by Massachusetts General Hospital Human Studies Protocol number 2001-001754.
Stimuli
Visual objects used in the experiment were either strongly related to a particular context (SC), or weakly associated with many contexts (WC) (see Figure 1 ). Objects were rated as either SC or WC based on previous pilot surveys as described in Bar and Aminoff (2003) . There were a total of 84 different contexts presented to the participant. There were three different objects associated with each context: two ''key'' objects, rated as most typical in the context, and one ''relevant'' object that was not highly associated with the context. Each participant at encoding saw one key object and one relevant object from each context on a given a trial. The purpose of this balancing was that one key object would be shown at encoding, and the other at test as a contextual lure item. Key objects were balanced between participants. There were a total of 252 SC objects used in this experiment, where only 168 of the SC objects were shown at encoding. There were also a total of 144 WC objects used at encoding. Fifty-seven new-unrelated objects were used as new items at test to obtain a baseline false alarm rate.
Procedure
Participants were scanned while they viewed photographs of everyday objects on a gray background. On each trial, two objects were presented side by side in the center of the screen. Each individual picture was 98 of visual angle; the two pictures together spanned a visual angle of 208. The pictures of objects were presented on a black screen. Each picture pair was presented for 1500 msec and there was a 1500-msec interstimulus interval. Picture trials were intermixed with fixation trials in a predetermined order to maximize efficiency and accuracy in extracting the hemodynamic response function (order was created by the function optseq, part of the FreeSurfer toolbox; http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard. edu/optseq/). There were a total of 156 picture trials (84 SC trials and 72 WC trials) and 126 fixation trials spread over three functional runs.
The task for participants was to try to create a context between the two objects, and to press a button based on how many objects they associate with the context. Participants pressed ''1'' if they associated many objects with the context; ''2'' if they associated just a few additional items with context; ''3'' if they could take the two objects presented and put them into a context together but did not associate any other objects with the context; and ''4'' if they could not even put the two objects presented in a context together.
The next day, participants returned for the testing period of the experiment. In the test, a word was presented and the participant determined whether the word was presented the day before as a picture, and thus, is ''old''; or if the word was not a picture presented the day before and therefore is ''new.'' If the participants decided the word was ''old,'' they were asked to make a further judgment of whether they vividly remember seeing the picture (i.e., ''remember''), or if they just had a feeling of knowing that the word was presented as a picture the day before (i.e., ''know''). Each word corresponded to one of four conditions: a strong contextual item presented the day before as a picture (strong-old); a weak contextual item presented the day before (weak-old); a strong contextually item related to a contextually related pair at encoding (strong-lure); and a new item unrelated to any of the pictures presented at encoding (new-unrelated). The contexts were split such that half the contexts (n = 42) were presented with a strong context old item, and the other half (n = 42) were presented with a strong context lure item. Contexts were balanced between participants. Half the weak context items presented at encoding were presented at test as a weak-old item (n = 36). There were 57 new-unrelated trials.
Imaging Parameters
The participants engaged in the encoding phase while whole-brain fMRI scans were collected on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra head-only scanner using a gradient echo-planar imaging sequence (TR = 3000 msec, TE = 25 msec, flip angle = 908). The acquired slices were axial, parallel to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line (33 slices, 3 mm, 1 mm skip). Each participant participated in a series of anatomical scans as well as three functional scans.
Data Analysis
The data from seven participants that were originally scanned were excluded from the analysis because we used a criterion of at least 10 observations per participant in the strong false alarm condition to provide sufficient numbers of trials for the fMRI analysis. Two participants were excluded from the analyses because they did not show activation of the context network indicated by comparing strong to weak trials. The remaining 16 participants were averaged in the group analysis.
Functional data were analyzed using the FreeSurfer analysis tools. Data from individual fMRI runs were first corrected for motion using the AFNI package (Cox,1996) and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian full-width, halfmaximum (FWHM) filter of 5 mm. The intensities for all runs were then normalized to correct for signal intensity changes and temporal drift, with global rescaling for each run to a mean intensity of 1000.
Performance on the memory test the day after the scanning session was used to back-sort the trials at encoding. Thus, each trial at encoding was defined by the performance at test. Signal intensity for each condition was then computed and averaged across runs. A finite impulse response model was used for the analysis. To account for intrinsic serial correlation in the fMRI data within participants, we used a global autocorrelation function that computes a whitening filter (Burock & Dale, 2000) . The data were then tested for statistical significance and activation maps were constructed for comparisons of the different conditions. Both group-average activation maps as well as regions of interest (ROIs) are random effect analyses.
Cortical Surface-based Analysis
Once the data from all trials were averaged, the mean and variance volumes were resampled onto the cortical surface for each participant. Each hemisphere was then morphed into a sphere in the following manner (Segonne et al., 2004; Fischl, Liu, & Dale, 2001; . First, each cortical hemisphere was morphed into a metrically optimal spherical surface. The pattern of cortical folds was then represented as a function on a unit sphere. Next, each individual participant's spherical representation was aligned with an averaged folding pattern constructed from a larger number of individuals aligned previously. This alignment was accomplished by maximizing the correlation between the individual and the group, while prohibiting changes in the surface topology and simultaneously penalizing excessive metric distortion (Fischl, Sereno, Tootell, & Dale, 1999) .
Region-of-interest Analysis
The ROIs for this study were chosen by the results of the strong versus weak contrast. The PHC ROIs as well as the MPFC RH were included as well due to a priori hypothesis of the involvement in contextual processing (Bar, 2004) . The PHC, RSC, and MPFC ROIs were defined structurally. The structural constraint of the PHC (encompassing the collateral sulcus and the parahippocampal gyrus) was based on a hand labeling of different brain structures for each participant. The PHC was defined using procedures elaborated in Insausti et al. (1998) and Reber, Wong, and Buxton (2002) . The RSC was handlabeled on each individual using a structural constraint based on anatomical landmarks of the calcarine sulcus, the parieto-occipital sulcus, the corpus callosum, and the posterior cingulate sulcus (refer to Figure 2 ). The MPFC was defined as anterior to the corpus callosum, and in front of and below the cingulate sulcus. The lateral parietal cortex (LP) and the occipito-temporal sulcus (OTS) ROIs were defined functionally. The anatomical location of the LP and OTS ROIs were defined by the cluster of activity significant in the strong versus weak contrast from the group analysis and then projected back to each individual's brain. For all ROIs, a functional constraint was used either by selecting the subset of voxels within each of these labels which demonstrated a significant effect of context (i.e., significant in the strong versus weak contrast) when examining the activation related to false recognition, or by any component of the task, as revealed by the main effect (i.e., all vs. fixation contrast) when examining the activation related to hits and misses. All of the voxels that met these constraints were then averaged, allowing the contrasts of interest to be computed across the resulting time courses. An outlier analysis was performed for each ROI, on each individual participant, such that the signal was averaged across conditions. If a participant had an average signal that was above the statistical threshold of 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of the group, they were considered an outlier and removed from the analysis for that specific ROI. In only the right RSC was an outlier found and is noted within the results. A one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed for experimental conditions on the mean percentage of peak signal change calculated for each condition.
RESULTS
To test our hypothesis, we first examined whether context indeed affects old-new recognition performance, which would be indicated by a significantly higher false alarm rate for the new-related lures compared with the new-unrelated baseline items. Second, to examine the neural regions that predict the occurrence of subsequent contextually related false recognition, we compared neural activity at encoding between the strong contextual pairs that led to a subsequent false alarm and the strong contextual pairs that led to a subsequent correct rejection of the new-related lure items. We hypothesized that regions that mediate the processing of contextual associations would demonstrate increased fMRI signal for those encoding trials that lead to subsequent false alarms compared with trials that lead to subsequent correct rejections. Such a result would support an account of false recognition whereby such errors stem from contextrelated coactivations.
Behavioral Results

Encoding Task
As noted earlier, the encoding task required participants to respond on a 4-point scale, where ''1'' reflected many associated objects with the context of the pair and ''4'' reflected an inability to relate the two objects presented to a shared context. The average response in the strong contextual trials was 1.43 (SD = .37), whereas the average response for the weak contextual trials was 3.27 (SD = .51). This difference in relating the two objects to a larger context was statistically significant [t(15) = 15.4, p < .001], validating our initial distinction between strong and weak contextual objects pairs. There was also a significant reaction time difference in the encoding task when comparing the strong contextual trials (1.42 sec) to the weak contextual trials [1.7 sec, t(15) = 4.26, p < .001]. We attribute this reaction time difference to the difficulty of determining whether the weak contextual pair of objects fit into a context together and the ease to which a context was found for the strong contextual trials.
Recognition Task
A significant effect of contextual associations was obtained for the likelihood of false recognition to a related item, relative to unrelated new item (see Table 1 ). Specifically, participants made 18% more false recognition responses (i.e., rating a new item as ''old'') for contextually related lure (new-related) items compared to novel, unrelated items [new-unrelated; t(15) = 6.75, p < .001]. A similar contextual effect was also obtained for true recognition of old items in the strong (oldstrong) versus the weak (old-weak) contextual condition. Namely, participants recognized 21% more strong than weak old contextual items [t(15) = 6.95, p < .001].
Although no significant differences in reaction times were found at test, participants were faster to respond in the encoding phase to the strong contextual trials that later led to a false alarm (1.38 sec) compared to those trials that led to correct rejections (1.43 sec), hits (1.43 sec), and misses (1.53 sec). This difference only reached marginal significance at a two-tailed comparison with correct rejections [t(15) = 2.00, p < .06] and hits [t(15) = 1.84, p < .09]. There was no significant reaction time differences between the weak contextual trials that resulted in a subsequent hit (1.69 sec) versus a miss
An ANOVA demonstrated a marginal effect of response choice (i.e., the 4-point scale determining the fMRI Results
Localizing the Context Network
The initial stage of the fMRI analysis was to localize areas within the cortex that show differential activity specific to contextual processing. To accomplish this objective, trials in which the participants associated the pair of objects with a context with other objects (i.e., a response of ''1'' or ''2'') were compared with the trials in which the participant did not associate the pair of objects with any context and therefore were considered a weak context, or a noncontextual trial (i.e., a response . ROI analysis for regions that process contextual associations. Conditions shown are the encoding data for the strong contextual trials that, at test, participants had to determine if a related lure item was old (i.e., a false alarm) or new (i.e., a correct rejection). Error bars represent one standard error. *p < .05. ROI analyses were run on all the regions that exhibited differential activity in context compared to the no-context trials as well as the PHC, to investigate whether activation at encoding in these regions related to subsequent false recognition of contextually related items. Results are shown in Figure 3 and Table 2 . Descriptions of how the ROIs were labeled in each individual can be found in the Methods section. In each ROI, we compared activity at encoding elicited for those trials that led to a false . ROI analysis for regions that process contextual associations. Trends were similar in both hemispheres, and thus, collapsed in the figure for simplicity. Conditions shown are the encoding data for the subsequent memory of an old item. Items were identified as strong or weak based on the initial presentation of the object: either in a strong contextual pair (strong) or in a pair of weak contextual objects (weak). Items correctly identified as old were considered a hit or if the old item was misidentified as new, it was considered a miss. Error bars represent one standard error.
recognition of a contextually related item (i.e., a false alarm) with the activity elicited for those trials that led to a subsequent correct rejection, where participants correctly identified the new item as new. Only voxels within these ROIs that demonstrated a significant differential activity for context versus no-context were included in the analysis defined on a participant-by-participant basis.
In the right RSC, one participant was removed due to particularly noisy data in this specific region, such that the activity from this region averaged across all conditions was above two standard deviations than the average of the group. The bilateral RSC, the left MPFC, and the bilateral LP all demonstrated a significant effect related to false recognition (Table 2 for statistical values). In each of these regions, during encoding, significantly more activity was elicited for those trials that led to subsequent false recognition compared to those trials that led to subsequent correct rejection of a contextually related item. In the one ROI that demonstrated greater activity elicited for no-context trials than context trials, there was a nonsignificant trend for the trials that led to correct rejections to activate more than those trials that led to false recognition. The results from this analysis indicate that activity in the regions that process contextual associations, specifically the RSC, the MPFC, and the LP, are predictive of subsequent false recognition for contextually related items.
Hits vs. Misses
In addition to examining the role of context in mediating false recognition, we conducted a post hoc analysis for other subsequent memory effects within the cortical contextual network. The data from five participants were removed from this specific analysis of hits versus misses because of an insufficient number of miss trials using a criterion of at least 10 observations. Removing these participants did not change the trends in the false recognition data. These ROI analyses were run on all voxels that showed significant differential activity from baseline for any task-related activity performed on a participant-by-participant basis. This method allowed us to look at subsequent memory effects for both strong contextual items and weak contextual items, such that the voxels chosen were not biased toward strong context. Results are shown in Figure 4 . An ANOVA was run on each ROI examining the main effect of context and subsequent recognition of old items in each region. The statistical values can be found in Table 3 . This analysis revealed a significant main effect for context, but not for recognition of old items (i.e., hits and misses) in the RSC RH, MPFC RH, and bilateral LP. Although not significant, in the left hemisphere RSC and MPFC, the main effect of context trend was found as well. A main effect for recognition of old items was found only in the PHC RH. In each ROI, except for the OTS, the weak-miss condition elicited the least amount of activity, whereas both strong memory conditions, sometimes more for the strong-miss condition, elicited the most amount of activity. We propose that this pattern of activation is a demonstration of a contextual processing gradient, such that the most contextual processing occurs for the strongmiss and strong-hit condition, and the least, or none at all, occurs for the weak miss condition. This proposal will be elaborated in the Discussion.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with our primary hypothesis, activity in cortical areas related to contextual processing was found to be predictive of subsequent false recognition of new Statistical F and p values for ROI ANOVA looking at the main effect of context compared to the main effect of memory (i.e., recognition of old items) for encoding data of old items.
All p values are for two-tailed significance.
items that were contextually related to items presented at encoding. Combining behavioral and fMRI findings, we propose that this false recognition is a result of the coactivation of contextually associated information at the time of encoding. Previously we have defined the cortical network that processes contextual associations to include the RSC, PHC, and MPFC (Bar & Aminoff, 2003) . The cortical regions with differential activity related to processing contextual associations in this experiment was defined as the collection of areas showing greater activity when participants viewed pairs of objects with strong contextual associations compared with pairs of objects with weak contextual associations. The regions with differential activity include both overlap with the previously defined cortical network processing contextual associations, the RSC and MPFC, and an additional region, the LP. The PHC, although typically associated with contextual processing, did not show differential activity in this particular experiment, which we propose was a result of the unique task used here. Each region that did show differential contextual activity also showed greater activation at encoding for pairs of objects in which a related item was later falsely recognized as old, compared with when the related item was correctly identified as new. It is important to consider the possible contribution of each of these regions to the generation of contextual activation and false memories, and we elaborate on it next.
A visual context contains associative information about identities of objects that tend to share the same context, as well as the typical spatial relations between them when applicable. These contextual associations are bound together in a stored memory representation referred to as a ''context frame'' (Bar, 2004; Bar & Ullman, 1996) . The activation of a context frame presumably results in the activation of the associations inherent to that context, which we propose is the mechanism by which subsequent false recognition of contextually related items occurs. Data from previous studies provide compelling evidence that context frames might be stored and processed in the RSC (Epstein, Parker, & Feiler, 2007; Park, Intraub, Yi, Widders, & Chun, 2007; Fenske, Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2006; Bar & Aminoff, 2003) .
A context frame contains prototypical information about a specific context and, accordingly, is extracted from specific exemplars. For example, regardless of whether a kitchen is stainless steel modern, or country style rustic, all typical kitchens are expected to activate the same prototypical context frame of a ''kitchen.'' In support of the notion that the RSC mediates context frames, we have previously shown that the RSC is not sensitive to the specific visual properties of contextual representations, and processes context in a more ''gist''-like manner (Bar & Aminoff, 2003) . For example, the RSC responds equally to a strong contextual object presented in isolation or within a background. The strong contextual objects activated the RSC more than the weak contextual objects because, in both cases, the same context frame was activated, regardless of the specific visual properties of the stimulus presented. In further support of the idea that the RSC processes abstracted prototypical representations of context, and does not emphasize exact physical details, we have found the RSC to be equally active for objects strongly related to a context of a specific place (e.g., oven) and objects that are not related to a specific place (e.g., baby bottle) (Bar & Aminoff, 2003) . In addition, within the realm of scene processing, evidence suggests that the RSC processes scenes on a general, or prototypical level. For example, Park et al. (2007) demonstrated that activity in the RSC was related to adding information to a scene that likely appears just beyond the borders (i.e., boundary extension); and Epstein et al. (2007) reported results suggesting that the RSC processes scenes within the context of a broader environment (e.g., a school building in relation to the campus at large) rather than what was available in the immediate sensory environment (e.g., information limited to what was presented in the picture of the building). We therefore propose that the RSC processes a general, or prototypical, representation of a context, reminiscent of our definition of context frames. Hence, the activity elicited in the RSC is a manifestation of the activation of context frames and their inherent associations. Accordingly, this activation of the associations within a context frame is the source of subsequent false recognition of contextually related items.
Contextual associations are naturally beneficial to cognition (Davenport & Potter, 2004; Bar & Ullman, 1996; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Palmer, 1975) : The coactivation of contextual associations can facilitate the recognition of other objects in the environment by providing predictions about what is likely to occur in the specific context. It has been proposed that the role of the MPFC, in particular, is to generate predictions of what to expect in the immediate environment based on analogies linking the input with memory (Bar, 2004 (Bar, , 2007 . We propose that this occurs automatically and is the source of the MPFC activation during contextual processing at encoding. When participants were asked to put the two objects into a context and think of other objects associated with the context, the MPFC presumably was recruited to generate top-down predictions about the other objects that may appear in the same context, in cooperation with other components of the context network. The collective activation associated with these predictions has led the participants to falsely recognize contextually related items as ''old.'' Contextual associations not only generate predictions but can also direct attentional resources to items in our environment (Neider & Zelinsky, 2006; Chun & Nakayama, 2000) . The third area found in the context cortical network was in the LP, including parts of the inferior parietal lobule and the supramarginal gyrus. The LP has been implicated in orienting attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and in episodic memory . Recent work demonstrated that this may be the area where long-term memory and attention interact (Summerfield, Lepsien, Gitelman, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2006) . We therefore hypothesize that contextually specific processing found in this area is related to the top-down use of contextual associations to orient attention. Support for this proposal comes from a study that used a repetition priming paradigm and found similar activity in the LP related to the modulation of attentional deployment by the integration of semantic and spatial contextual information (Gronau, Neta, & Bar, 2008) . This LP showed here increased activation for those encoding trials that led to false recognition. It is possible that the specific task employed here, which required participants to think of as many other objects as possible that might appear in that context, promoted orienting responses while participants performed the mental ''search'' of their memory. This idea might further explain why activation in this area was less pronounced in other context studies, where the task did not require such active search of associates. Future experiments will be required to test this hypothesis and to characterize the involvement of this attention-related region in contextual processing in finer detail.
Previous studies indicate that the PHC plays a central role in processing contextual associations Bar et al., 2007; Fenske et al., 2006; Bar, 2004; Bar & Aminoff, 2003) . In the present study, however, no significant PHC activity specific for strong contextual trials was found in the group average. This lack of differential activity between strong and weak trials might provide additional clues regarding the role of the PHC in contextual processing. We propose that the PHC interacts with the RSC to activate the most appropriate context frame(s) based on the physical appearance of a context. While the PHC is sensitive to the specific physical properties of the input, the RSC contains a more gist-like, prototypical representation of contexts. This role of activating contextual associations that are relevant to the current episode implies that the PHC is sensitive to the specific aspects of the immediate environment. In contrast to the RSC, which processes prototypical representations of context abstracted from the details of immediate environment, we propose that the PHC processes visually specific contextual associations that more directly relate to the immediate environment. This proposal is supported by previous work that demonstrates the PHC was sensitive to the physical properties of the stimulus, for example, whether a strong contextual object was presented by itself or within a scene (Bar & Aminoff, 2003) . We also found the representations within the PHC are organized along a spatial hierarchy where more visually specific spatial representations are stored in the posterior and nonspatial representations are stored in the anterior . Epstein et al. (2003 Epstein et al. ( , 2007 have also provided support for visually specific representations in the PHC by demonstrating activity related to viewpoint specific scene processing, and, furthermore, activity related to scene recognition in the PHC was limited to the immediate environment rather than a broader context. We therefore propose that this ''on-line'' visually specific contextual processing in the PHC reflected an attempt to retrieve contextual associations and therefore was equally active for both the strong context trials and the weak context trials. In other words, in this task, the PHC performed a similar operation of contextual activation for both strong and weak context trials, therefore not showing a difference between the conditions in its response.
Although the main focus of this study concerns the role of the context network in mediating subsequent false recognition, it is interesting to consider the subsequent recognition differences in remembering old items (i.e., hits and misses). The PHC was the ROI that yielded a significant effect of recognition memory for old items. This is in accordance with previously reports that indicate a role of the PHC in the true memories as compared to false memories (Cabeza et al., 2001) . In each of the ROIs, the strong-miss condition demonstrated a trend of activating these regions the most, whereas the weak-miss condition demonstrated a trend of activating these regions the least. We propose that this pattern of results demonstrates a gradient of contextual associative processing such that the strong miss activates the related associations overly broadly such that the item-specific memory is lost; whereas the weak misses do not activate many associations, if any, and therefore have no cue to promote subsequent remembering. Strong hits activated the context regions more than weak hits due to the inherent contextual associations activated by the strong items. It was only in the PHC that the weak-hit condition activated as much as the strong context trials. We propose that this effect is related to the role of the PHC in carrying out ''online'' processing of associations. In the attempt of the PHC to activate contextual associations for the weak pair of objects, some of these items may have activated an association, although not to an extent sufficient for activating a context frame. It is possible that these associations facilitated the encoding of the item such that the item was correctly identified as old at test (i.e., weak hit). Further experiments will be needed to test the interaction of context memory and item-specific memory, specifically testing whether there are conditions where context memory overrides the item-specific memory.
It is important to characterize in more detail the exact neural mechanism that gives rise to false memory. In particular, two possibilities would have to be distinguished by future research. First, such false memory could be a result of a spreading coactivation of contextually related objects, whereby seeing a highly contextual object activates associated objects that belong in the same context frame such that later one cannot reliably distinguish between objects that were actually presented and strongly related objects that were not presented. In a second possible mechanism, a highly contextual object activates a context gist that afterward is retrieved and helps to infer old-new responses based on a global-matching process. Previous research has shown that spreading activation and gist information each contributes to various kinds of memory distortions (for review and discussion, see Schacter & Addis, 2007; Gallo, 2006; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; , but their respective roles in context-based false recognition is unknown. That the RSC has been shown to represent prototypical and non-item-specific context information supports a gist-based mechanism, whereas the fact that a gist can ''bootstrap'' the activation of more specific context information supports a spreading activation process.
Taken together, the results of this study provide insights into both the nature of memory distortion and the components of the cortical network that mediate contextual processing. 
b s t r a c t
Decision criterion is an important factor in recognition memory, determining the amount of evidence required to judge an item as previously encountered. For a typical recognition memory test involving the prior study of a set of items, a conservative criterion establishes a higher standard of evidence for recognition and designates fewer items as previously studied. In contrast, a liberal criterion establishes a lower standard of evidence and designates more items as previously studied. Therefore, the hit rate and the correct rejection rate on a recognition memory test can be affected by both the memory strength of the studied items and the criterion used to make that judgment. Yet most neuroimaging studies of the successful retrieval effect (a contrast between hits and correct rejections) fail to measure or consider decision criterion. The goal of the current fMRI study with ninety-five participants was to directly manipulate decision criteria on two tests of recognition memory by varying the likelihood of an item's prior occurrence. Our results indicate that regions of the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex associated with successful retrieval are significantly more active when using conservative criteria than liberal criteria. Furthermore, our results reveal that activity in these regions associated with successful retrieval can be accounted for by individual differences in the conservativeness of the decision criterion above and beyond any differences in memory strength. These results expound on the role of cognitive control in recognition memory and the neural mechanisms that mediate this processing.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Neural investigations into memory processing have often compared the response associated with correctly recognizing old items (hits) relative to the response associated with correctly rejecting new items (correct rejections), commonly referred to as the successful retrieval effect. This contrast has a robust neural signature spanning large regions of the frontal and parietal cortex (see . The functional significance of this pattern of activity has been intensely investigated, and has been linked to different aspects of the retrieval process, including those specifically related to the memory content and other aspects such as the control of attention and retrieval orienting (see Miller and Dobbins, in press) . In this study, we examined a specific decision process in recognition memory that is often neglected in neuroimaging studies: the maintenance of a decision criterion used to evaluate memory retrieval across a period of time. In a large-scale fMRI study of 95 participants, we examined the sensitivity of successful retrieval brain activity when at times a conservative criterion was engaged and at other times a liberal criterion was engaged on two tests of recognition memory. The results from this study provide new insight into the role of decision criterion in memory retrieval mechanisms.
The outcome of the recognition judgment in a memory test is dependent on both the sensitivity in discriminating old items (targets) from new items (distractors) and the placement of a decision criterion (see Fig. 1A ). In a Signal Detection Theory framework (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) , both targets and distractors will be normally distributed along an axis of memory strength. Sensitivity, as measured by d′, is the distance between the mean of the target distribution from the mean of the distractor distribution. Decision criterion is the point along a continuum of memory strength that is used to determine whether there is enough evidence to consider an item as previously encountered. Test items with less memory strength than the decision criterion would be judged as new. The more conservative a criterion, the more evidence, i.e., memory strength, is needed to respond "old" on a recognition test. A decision criterion is typically set with respect to a certain strategy such that optimal decision-making may require individuals to flexibly adapt criterion in response to changing information (e.g., base rate probability) (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005; Hockley, 2011; Aminoff et al., 2012) .
Neuroimaging studies of recognition memory have typically focused on the contrast between successfully retrieved old items and successfully rejected new items . This commonly became known as the "successful retrieval effect." In this study, we will simply refer to this contrast in neural activity as the H4 CR effect. Although the H4CR contrast has been used as the hallmark of studying successful memory retrieval, this contrast is rarely considered in behavioral studies of recognition memory. In a behavioral sense, the processes involved in this contrast would necessarily depend on both discrimination of targets from distractors (as measured by d′) and the placement of the decision criterion. However, brain activity associated with H 4 CR can be related to discrimination only, criterion only, or some combination of both. Yet, criterion placement is often not considered in interpretations of neuroimaging studies of recognition memory. In fact, criterion measures are rarely manipulated or even reported in neuroimaging studies.
Many previous neuroimaging studies have claimed that the H4CR contrast represents the mnemonic contents of successfully retrieving a studied item, which would be affected by varying levels of discrimination (Wheeler and Buckner, 2003; Kahn et al., 2004; Vilberg and Rugg, 2008; Shimamura, 2011; Yu et al., 2012; Criss et al., 2013) . For example, the neural activity of the H4CR contrast could arise from hits having greater memory strength than correct rejections, regardless of where the decision criterion lies along an axis of memory strength. However, recent studies have demonstrated that H 4CR activity represents non-mnemonic cognitive processes, such as attention and decision-making related to the recognition judgment, rather than the memory content, per se, which may be affected by variations in criterion placement (Cabeza et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2008; O'Connor et al., 2010; Jaeger et al., 2013; Miller and Dobbins, in press) . In this alternative, the brain signal of the H4 CR contrast could arise simply from hits having memory strength that exceeds the decision criterion and thus yielding an "old" response, whereas correct rejections do not. Therefore, the H 4CR contrast could be an effect of the cognitive processes used for a particular response type as determined by a decision criterion rather than differences in memory strength. Alternatively, the H4CR effect could be the result of both. Unfortunately, most neuroimaging studies utilizing an H4CR contrast report measures of memory strength but not measures of decision criteria. A memory test paradigm where the H4CR effect was measured across differing decision criteria could assess these various alternatives. The goal of this study is to directly examine the extent to which maintaining a particular decision criterion affects the brain activity associated with the contrast between hits and correct rejections.
A memory strength account of the H4CR effect, such as the accumulation of mnemonic evidence associated with hits but not with correct rejections ( 
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buffering of retrieved information associated with hits but not with correct rejections (Vilberg and Rugg, 2008; , would claim that brain activity is tracking with the difference in memory strength between hits and correct rejections. When comparing the memory strength for all memory response types (hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections) the mean memory strength for hits should be the strongest (i.e., responded "old" to an old item); the mean memory strength for false alarms (i.e., responding "old" to a new item) should be greater than the mean memory strength for misses (i.e., responding "new" to an old item); and the mean strength of misses should be greater than the mean memory strength for correct rejections (i.e., responding "new" to a new item). Indeed, this pattern of brain activity (hits 4false alarms 4misses 4correct rejections, Fig. 1B ) has been reported previously providing evidence for a strength-based account (Kahn et al., 2004; Wheeler and Buckner, 2003) . However, these studies did not manipulate the decision criterion. Thus, it is not clear to what extent the placement of the criterion may also be affecting the activity associated with hits minus correction rejections. According to a memory strength account, a change in decision criterion may slightly affect the signal strength of particular trial types, but the relative order of the trial types in signal strength will always be the same (i.e., hits 4false alarms 4mis-ses 4correct rejections) (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) .
Alternatively, the H4 CR effect could be due exclusively to biasing an "old" or a "new" response (i.e., the placement of a decision criterion) and have little to do with a difference in memory strength and item history (see Miller and Dobbins, in press) (Fig. 1C) . For example, in a condition in which participants are being conservative with their decision criteria, and thus require a high level of memory evidence for judging an item as old, they are biasing a "new" response (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) . In this case, brain activity in certain regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortex may be more active when responding "old" to old items (hits), i.e., away from the biased response, than when responding "new" to new items, i.e. toward the biased response. Although the outcome is the same (i.e. more brain activity to hits than to correct rejections) the driving force behind this differential activity is due to a movement away from a proclivity in response type, not to a difference in memory strength. Under this framework, when participants are being liberal with their decision criterion, the opposite effect in brain activity may occur with activity being greater when responding "new" (now responding away from the biased response) to new items (correct rejections) than when responding "old" (toward the biased response) to old items (hits). Historically, only hits greater than correct rejections (H 4CR effect) have been robust, rather than an effect of correct rejections greater than hits (but see also Jaeger et al., 2013 , O'Connor et al., 2010 . This may be due to general conservativeness of participants in a memory experiment being conducted within an MRI scanner (Gutchess and Park, 2006) , though criterion measures are rarely reported.
If response bias were driving the H4CR effect, then this would indicate that the brain activity reflects decision processing rather than memory content. This view is supported by a recent neuroimaging study by Jaeger et al. (2013) that examined the relationship between expectancy violations and memory evidence using a trial-by-trial cue validity paradigm. In this study, an explicit memory cueing paradigm was used wherein participants were first shown a cue on each trial (Likely New or Likely Old) and then shown a test item (target or distractor). Cues were valid 80% of the time. Similar to spatial cuing on a visual target detection paradigm, the cue in this case (e.g., Likely New) sets up the expectation that the next trial will be of a certain type (e.g., a new item), biasing the response of the participant. Critically, in support of the bias account, the large portions of the prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex tracked with the validity of the trials and not the successful memory of the trial (Jaeger et al., 2013) . In other words, the activity in these regions was greater for hits than for correct rejections, but only when participants were expecting a new item as indicated by the cue (Likely New); however in the case where novelty was unexpected (Likely Old), there was greater activity for correct rejections than for hits. This is an effect predicted by a bias account but not by a strength-based account of the H4CR effect. The authors framed this effect in terms of memory orienting similar to spatial orienting. For example, during a trial that is cued as "likely new," an unexpectedly familiar test probe may reorient the individual's attention and/or strategy to the probe. As Jaeger and colleagues noted, this activity represents executive processing needed to respond in the opposite direction of the participant's expectations.
There are two critical differences between the predictions of the memory strength account and the predictions of the response bias account of the H 4CR effect (Fig. 1) . One of these differences occurs when using a conservative decision criterion. According to the bias account, the activity associated with making an "old" response should be greater than the activity associated with making a "new" response, which is the same prediction made by a memory strength account for hits versus correct rejections. However, a strict bias account would also predict that responding "old" to new items (false alarms) should be just as active as hits, and that responding "new" to old items (misses) should not be any more active than correct rejections. The second difference between the predictions of the two accounts occurs when using a liberal decision criterion -meaning when the level for memory strength necessary to respond "old" is low, and thus more items are judged as "old". In this case, participants are now biased to respond "old." Therefore, if the H4 CR effect were only related to executive processing needed to make a response away from the expected or biased response, then it would predict brain activity would be greater for responding "new" than for responding "old" (the biased response). This would produce activity that is greater for correct rejections than for hits within a liberal condition, a pattern that could not be accounted for by a memory strength account.
The plausibility of a bias account of the H 4CR effect is supported by neuropsychological data as well. Neuropsychological evidence showed regions of the brain associated with the H 4CR effect (the prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex) can be damaged with little effect on recognition memory, but can affect response biases, causing many patients to respond more liberally than matched controls (Ally et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2010; Dobbins et al., 2012; Simons et al., 2009) .
However, an important distinction between the bias account described above (see Fig. 1C ) and the results reported by Jaeger et al. (2013) is that their reported effects due to the expectancy of the test item interacted significantly with the memory strength of the old items. As they suggested, the effects of memory orienting depend on the ability of the participants to discriminate old items from new items (i.e., d′). The higher the d′ the more an incongruent cue (e.g., Likely Old for a distractor) would affect their expectations. In contrast, the bias account (Fig. 1C) would not predict this correlation with d′ or any interaction with the presentation history of the item. Any brain activation that is based purely on the biasing of a particular response should not be affected by whether or not the item was old. In addition, Jaeger and colleagues varied the expectation of the target, and thus the bias of the participant, on a trial-by-trial basis. It is unknown if a similar effect would be found if the bias, or criterion, was maintained across a block of trials.
The purpose of our study was to examine the nature of the H4CR effect and to investigate whether maintaining a response bias could account for the brain activity associated with memory retrieval. To this end, we used a memory test paradigm that directly manipulated decision criterion by employing a cue indicating the probability that the test item was viewed during the study session (either 70% or 30%). We used this paradigm in two study/ test sessions with each participant, one with word stimuli and the other with face stimuli. We utilized three general techniques to examine the relationship between response bias and the H 4 CR effect. First, we made the recognition tests difficult enough so that discriminating between old and new items would not be easy. A moderately low d′ also ensures that most participants will affectively shift their criterion in response to the probability information of the cue (see Aminoff et al., 2012) . Second, we utilized a blockwise paradigm that required participants to maintain a criterion across a block of trials. Third, we included a large number of participants (N ¼ 95). By contrast, the Jaeger et al. (2013) study had 18 subjects. This large sample gave us significant power to carefully examine the relationship between H4CR brain activity and individual differences in d′ and criterion placement. Our goal was to determine whether any of the H4CR effect could be explained purely on the basis of a response bias.
In a full investigation of the behavioral results of this study, Aminoff et al. (2012) found that changes in target probability significantly affected participants' criteria. Participants used a liberal criterion for blocks of trials with a 70% target probability, and they used a conservative criterion for blocks of trials with a 30% target probability. The current study examined the brain mechanisms underlying these behavioral effects.
Materials and methods
Participants
One hundred and thirty three individuals were recruited to participate in this study. However, 38 of the participants were not used in the final analysis due to the following reasons: 8 did not pass MRI safety screening measures; 4 were claustrophobic; 5 had a technical error in data collection; 20 participants did not respond to more than 40 trials (over 10% of the trials) in either the Words or the Faces test (some of these participants reported falling asleep); and 1 did not follow instructions on the task.
Data were analyzed from 95 participants: ages 27-47 (M ¼35); 5 females; 12 left-handed. This study was part of a larger project investigating the individual variability in the structure and function of brain activity in combat-experienced Army officerstherefore the participants were either a combat-experienced Army officer (N ¼68) or an individual from the Santa Barbara community (N ¼ 27), a majority of who were graduate students or postdoctoral researchers (n ¼ 21/27). Informed written consent was obtained from each participant prior to the experimental sessions. All procedures were approved by the University of California, Santa Barbara Human Subjects Committee.
Stimuli
Three hundred and sixty faces and three hundred and sixty words were used as stimuli in this experiment. Faces of varying ethnicity were depicted in black and white photographs. Words were four to eight letters in length. Words in the target and distractor lists were matched for imageability (range 502-655) and frequency (range 1-382; Kucera-Francis written frequency count) as evaluated through the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (http://www. psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm). Words were presented in Arial font with a font size of 40. Faces were 2.78 in. by 3.33 in.. Stimuli were counter-balanced across participants and conditions.
Experimental procedure
Overall Procedure -To familiarize participants with the task prior to entering the MRI scanner, each individual participated in a short practice session. The practice included separate study sessions of 15 words and 15 faces, and separate test sessions of 30 words and 30 faces, respectively. Once comfortable with the task, participants were placed in the MRI scanner. Participants were reminded of the instructions and began the first study session (either faces or words), during which imaging data was not collected. Once completed, a high-resolution anatomical scan was acquired, which lasted nine minutes, during which a screen saver was presented on the screen. Participants were then reminded of the instructions for the test session and performed the recognition memory test (either the faces or words stimuli depending on the preceding study session) while functional MRI scans were collected. Immediately following the first study-test session, they participated in the second study-test session. The delay between the second study and test session was also around 9 min during which a diffusion tensor imaging scan was acquired. Each participant had separate study and test sessions for each set of stimuli (either faces or words) in which the order (first or second study/ test) was counter-balanced across participants. In addition, participants filled out a number of questionnaires assessing factors that could account for individual differences in behavior (e.g., cognitive style, personality, and mental health), which is beyond the scope of the current paper. A full analysis of these individual differences can be found in Aminoff et al. (2012) .
Study session (not scanned)
One hundred and eighty stimuli (either faces or words) were presented sequentially in the center of the screen on a white background. Words were presented in black font and faces were presented without a frame. Stimuli were shown for 1 s (words) or 1.5 s (faces) and both were separated by a 1 s inter-trial-interval. Participants were instructed to remember each stimulus for a later memory test. To facilitate deep encoding of the faces, which were harder to remember, participants judged whether each face was pleasant or unpleasant via a button press. The words were passively viewed.
Test session (scanned approximately 9 min after the study session)
Each test consisted of the 180 stimuli previously studied, and 180 novel stimuli. Test stimuli were divided into two conditions: a high probability condition in which the stimulus had a 70% probability of being old (i.e., studied previously), or a low probability condition, in which there was a 30% probability of being old. Probability condition was cued via font color for words (red or green) or a colored, rectangular frame around the picture for faces (red or green). The association between color and condition was counter-balanced. Stimuli were presented in the same size and location as the study session for 1.5 s with a 1 s inter-trial-interval.
Participants were instructed to determine whether the stimulus was previously studied, and to press the respective button for an old or new response. Instructions to the participants included explicit information about the color cue, which indicated the probability that the stimulus was old. Participants were told which color indicated a 70% likelihood that the stimulus was old, and thus highly likely that it was seen during the study session and which color indicated a 30% likelihood that the stimulus was old, and was therefore mostly likely a new stimulus not presented at study. Participants were told that these were accurate probabilities and there was no deception. However, the instructions did not explicitly tell the participant to incorporate the probability into the memory judgment. Stimuli were presented in a pseudo-block format: six to nine trials of the same probability were presented before the probability switched. Old and new stimuli were intermixed within these blocks. The probability indicated by the color cue did not necessarily correspond to the proportion of old and new stimuli within each mini-block (i.e., the 6-9 trials in a row) but rather to the distribution within the overall test session. 180 fixation trials were intermixed throughout the entire test session, and consisted of a black " þ" symbol presented at the center of the screen for 2.5 s. Refer to Fig. 2 for an illustration of the trial sequence.
This procedure and parameters were used for the majority of our participants (participants 31-133), however the first 30 participants (only 20 of which were used in the final analysis) had a slight variation of the sequence of events (regarding the delay between study and test) and durations of study presentation. These procedural variations of the study session were done in an attempt (unsuccessfully) to equalize the memory strength of face and word stimuli. A one-way ANOVA determined there were no significant differences in criterion or d′ due to procedural variations.
Memory behavioral data analysis
A full behavioral analysis of this dataset has been reported previously (Aminoff et al., 2012) . For the purposes of this study, sensitivity and criterion were calculated for each participant separately for the low and high probability conditions in each test (separately for words and faces). Sensitivity (or accuracy) was calculated using the formula: d′¼z(hits) À z(false alarms). Criterion was calculated using the formula: c¼ À.5(z(hits) þz(false alarms)). Trials that received either no response or multiple responses were not included in any of the analyses.
Reliance on the cue information
Subjective assessments of the degree to which participants relied on the probability cues in making their recognition judgments were obtained in post-experiment questionnaires using both free responses and a rating scale describing whether the memory judgment at test typically relied on probability information or memory strength (scale was 1-10, with 1 being least and 10 being most). Two raters scored the free response questions with high consistency (words r¼ .84; faces r ¼.84). The free response ratings between the two raters were then averaged together. The final strategy score was an average of the averaged free response ratings and the ratings given by the participant in the questionnaire (consistency for words r ¼.65; for faces r ¼.61).
MRI data acquisition
Participants were scanned at the UCSB Brain Imaging Center using a 3 T Siemens TIM Trio with a standard 12-channel head coil. Cushions were placed around the head to minimize head motion. Participants held a MRI compatible response box with two buttons in their right hand and a squeeze ball for emergency purposes in their left hand. Stimuli for the experiment were projected on a screen behind the participant when lying in the scanner. A mirror mounted on the head coil reflected the images from the screen for the participant to view. Functional runs consisted of a T2 nweighted single shot gradient echo, echo-planar sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR ¼ 2.5 s, TE ¼ 30 ms, FA ¼90°) with generalized autocalibrating partially parallel acquisitions (GRAPPA). Each volume consisted of 37 slices acquired parallel to the AC-PC plane, although the angle was slightly adjusted to optimize for frontal acquisition if necessary (interleaved, 3 mm thickness with .5 mm gap; 3 mm Â 3 mm in-plane resolution). A total of 540 volumes were acquired for each test run (two total: faces and words), which consisted of 360 stimulus trials and 180 fixation trials. A high-resolution anatomical image was collected at the beginning of the scan session for each participant using an MPRAGE sequence (TR ¼2300; TE ¼2.98 ms; FA ¼9°; 160 slices; 1.10 mm thickness).
In addition to the functional and high-resolution anatomical scans, a diffusion-tensor, a resting state, and two additional functional scans (at the end of the session) were collected for a Aminoff et al. (2012) . Participants studied 180 of each stimulus set. Studied stimuli were presented in black font and without a colored frame (top). Stimuli at test (N ¼360) were presented with a color cue via the font or a frame around the picture that indicated the probability that the item had been presented during the study session (bottom). Intermixed with stimulus trials were fixation trials on which a "þ " was presented, and there was no task performed on these trials. Trials were presented in blocks of six to nine trials of the same probability before the probability switched. The figure depicts only a portion of each block: only the last four trials (out of the six to nine possible) in the block for the high-probability condition (i.e., green) and the beginning two trials (out of the six to nine possible) in the block for the low-probability condition (i.e., red). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) separate experiment (Hermunstad et al., 2013; Hermunstad et al., 2014) and were not used in the present analysis.
2.6. fMRI data analysis 2.6.1. Preprocessing
Standard preprocessing was conducted using SPM5 (http:// www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Images were realigned to correct for minor head motion by registering all images to the first image of the series. Functional images were coregistered to the anatomical image. The anatomical image was normalized using combined segmentation and normalization to conform to the MNI-152 template. The parameters of this transformation were applied to the functional images, which were re-sampled to 2 mm isotropic voxels. Functional images were then smoothed using an isotropic Gaussian kernel (FWHM¼ 8 mm).
General linear model and second level analysis
fMRI data were analyzed in an event-related paradigm using a canonical hemodynamic response function separately for the words and the faces test dataset. Each event was modeled within a 16 s time window. A high-pass filter using 128 s was implemented. The general linear model incorporated a robust weighted least squares (rWLS) algorithm (Diedrichsen and Shadmehr, 2005) . The purpose of the rWLS algorithm was to weight each image by the noise in the image, so that images with a large amount of noise (e.g., due to movement) would be weighted less in the final model compared to an image with relatively less noise. The rWLS method used a covariance model that estimated the noise in each image of the un-smoothed data. Afterwards, those estimates were applied as weights in a second pass on the smoothed data. The model simultaneously estimated the noise covariates and temporal autocorrelation for later use as nuisance regressors. These covariates were then modeled within the design matrix.
Trials were presented in an event-related design that optimized the extraction of BOLD signal related to the contrasts of interest. The intermixed order of fixation, old, and new items, as well as a range in the length of the block (6-9 trials) enabled the use of an event-related analysis despite the probability cues being presented in mini-blocks. For both the faces and words tasks, a memory retrieval analysis modeled eight conditions: hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections, separately for the trials in the high probability condition and the low probability condition. A critical contrast examining differential beta estimates was constructed using hits versus correct rejections to examine the neural correlates of "successful retrieval" (separately for high and low probability conditions). These contrast maps were then passed to a second-level random effects analysis that consisted of testing the contrast against zero using a voxel-wise single-sample t-test. All group maps presented are whole-brain analyses using an FDR correction of q ¼.05. For visualization purposes, group t maps, corrected for multiple comparisons, were rendered onto 3D inflated brains using the CARET software (Van Essen et al., 2001 ).
Regional brain analyses
The goal of this analysis was to determine whether or not the brain activity elicited by H4 CR could be attributed to a particular criterion placement or the strength of the memory. We functionally derived ROIs from the peak voxels of the H 4CR contrast (collapsed across probability conditions) directly from each task (see Table 2 for a listing of the peak voxels). These ROIs were defined irrespective of the participants' criteria or sensitivity since the neural activity associated with H4CR could be affected by c alone, d′ alone, or both. The peak voxels defined the center of each 10 mm spherical ROI. ROI data extraction was performed using the MarsBaR toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/index.html; Brett et al., 2002) in which weighted parameter estimates (i.e. beta values) from the contrasts of interest were averaged across all voxels within each 10 mm spherical ROI and extracted. This resulted in a single beta value for each contrast for each ROI. These beta values were used for all subsequent analyses. The ROIs were corrected for multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni correction. These values were then submitted to a hierarchical multiple regression analyses for each ROI that first partialled out any variance that could be accounted for by individual differences in d′ or reaction time. This was done to determine whether any portion of the variance in brain activity could be due exclusively to the criterion of the participant.
Results
Our main goal was to evaluate whether decision criterion modulated the H4 CR effect, thereby directly testing the response bias account against the memory strength account. A response bias account had three predictions: (1) a H 4 CR effect would be found when using a conservative criterion, as in the low probability condition, but would not be found when using a liberal criterion, as in the high probability condition, since "new" is no longer the biased response -in fact, a bias account would predict in this condition that activity would be greater for correct rejections than for hits when using a liberal criterion; (2) individual differences in the extent of the criterion (i.e., the more conservative in the low probability condition and the more liberal in the high probability condition) would correlate with the H 4CR effect but not individual differences in d′, whereas the memory strength account would predict the opposite; and (3) the pattern of brain activity for hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections could be explained by the response type (i.e., "old" versus "new") and not by item history (i.e., old items versus new items) (see Fig. 1C ). Table 1 summarizes the behavioral performance in terms of criterion (c), sensitivity or accuracy (d′), reaction time, and reliance on the cue information. The main manipulation of target probability was successful: on average, participants applied a more liberal criterion for the high probability condition and a more conservative criterion in the low probability condition confirmed by a significant main effect of the probability condition on criterion across both tasks (F(1,94) ¼243.24, po 10 À 28 , MSE ¼.37) in a repeated measures ANOVA. Also, there was no significant main effect of task stimuli (words or faces) on criterion (F(1,94) ¼0.03, n. s., MSE ¼.19). A full behavioral analysis of this variation in the tendency to shift a decision criterion has been reported previously (Aminoff et al., 2012) . The degree to which an individual shifted a criterion was used in a later fMRI analysis. While sensitivity and criterion are theoretically independent (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) , it is known that movements in criterion can be affected by varying levels of sensitivity (Hirshman, 1995; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005; Aminoff et al., 2012) . For example, Aminoff et al. (2012) demonstrated that the more an individual remembers the studied items the less they need to shift a decision criterion in response to changes in target probability. The end result of that relationship may be that the magnitude of the criterion is less for those individuals with a higher d′. As reported in Aminoff et al. (2012) , we found that the higher the individual d′ the less liberal the individual criterion in the high target probability condition (words, r ¼.29, p ¼.004; faces, r ¼.29, p ¼.005), while the higher the individual d′ the less conservative the individual criterion in the low target probability condition (words, r ¼ À.13, n.s.; faces, r ¼ À.20, p ¼.056). Further, while reaction time was not significantly correlated with criterion in any of the conditions, the participant's selfreported reliance on the probability cue was significantly correlated with criterion in the low target probability conditions using words (low probability, r ¼ .23, p ¼.022; high probability, r ¼ À.065, n.s.) and with criterion in the high target probability condition using faces (low probability, r ¼.098, n.s.; high probability, r¼ À.21, p ¼.037). Since any of these three factors may moderate the relationship between the magnitude of a criterion and H 4CR brain activity, we partialled out these relationships in the subsequent hierarchical regression analyses.
Behavioral results
Task stimuli
Separate analyses were carried out across two independent memory tests (words and faces) within the same individuals. There was no main effect of stimuli with respect to the criterion used (F(1,94) ¼0.03, n.s., MSE ¼ .19). However, despite our early attempts to equalize the sensitivity performance (as measured by d′) between the task with word stimuli and the task with face stimuli, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of task (F(1,94) ¼12.08, p o.001, MSE ¼ .66), with the word stimuli being better remembered than the face stimuli. After testing, several participants reported that the recognition test with the face stimuli was more difficult than the words. Reaction time was also different between the two test stimuli. As shown in Table 1, participants were significantly slower for faces than for words (F(1,94)¼70.21, p o10 À 13 , MSE ¼.016). Lastly, a self-reported measure of how much the participant relied on the cue information to make their recognition judgment showed a higher score for face stimuli than it did for word stimuli (t(94) ¼ À3.35, p o.001), which may be attributed to the difficultly of the face task. However, even though differences exist across the two tasks, all fMRI comparisons are made within test, and only examined across the two tests for consistency.
fMRI results
3.2.1. Prediction 1: H 4CR would be evident in the low probability condition but not in the high probability condition One of the primary aims of this study was to examine whether the brain activity associated with H4CR could be modulated by changes in decision criterion. To this end, two contrasts of interest were analyzed: H4CR in the high probability condition and H4CR in the low probability condition. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the memory strength account and the response bias account make different predictions about the resulting contrast of brain activity. If memory strength accounts for the difference in brain activity between hits and correct rejections, then greater activity should be observed for hits than for correct rejections across both probability conditions equally. However, if response bias accounts for the difference in neural activity, then greater activity should be observed for hits than for correct rejections in the low probability condition but not in the high probability condition. Furthermore, a bias account would predict that in the high probability condition brain activity should actually be greater for correct rejections than for hits because the bias is now to respond "old".
As shown in Fig. 3 and in Table 2 , the H4 CR contrasts yielded significant differential activity throughout the lateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior insula, superior parietal cortex above the intraparietal sulcus, and regions of the lateral parietal cortex lying below the intraparietal sulcus, in both the left and right hemisphere. This effect was most evident in the low probability condition, in which old items were less likely to occur than new items and the criterion placement by the participants was conservative. These patterns of brain activity were almost identical between the recognition test with word stimuli and the recognition test with face stimuli, with the word stimuli producing slightly more significant activity than face stimuli. As shown in Fig. 4 , the differences between the two probability conditions were directly analyzed by contrasting the H4 CR contrast in the low probability condition with the H4CR contrast in the high probability condition. This analysis confirmed significantly more H4CR activity in the low probability condition than in the high probability condition. Critically, there was no difference in sensitivity (d′) between the two probability conditions. These results could not be predicted by a memory-strength based account of the H 4CR effect. Thus, the first prediction of the bias account was confirmed: greater BOLD signal was associated with hits than with correct rejections in the low probability condition, where a conservative criterion was used, than in the high probability condition, where a liberal criterion was used.
However, it should be noted that, when an "old" response was biased, as in the high probability condition, the pattern of differential BOLD signal in the contrast of hits versus correct rejections (Figs. 3 and 4) did not exhibit a change in the direction of activations (with CR being greater than H) as would be predicted by the bias account in Fig. 1 . That is, when participants were biased to respond "old" (liberal) when the probability of a target was high, there were no significant activations related to correct rejections that was greater than activations related to hits, nor were that any differences found in this direction between the high probability and the low probabiity conditions. While this would not be predicted by a memory-strength account of the H4CR effect, it would also not be predicted by the bias account. We next turn to an analysis of individual differences to investigate this point further.
Individuals varied the extent to which their decision criteria shifted in response to the change in probability information, which correlated with the magnitude of the criterion used in each condition. As reported by Aminoff et al. (2012) , there was enornous individual variability in criterion shifting, with some individuals shifting their criterion to the extreme while others did not shift at all. To examine this, a tertiary split of the participants according to the degree to which they shifted their criterion between the two probability conditions was conducted, such that high shifters were compared to the low shifters. Behavioral analyses of the criterion difference between the two groups confirmed that the high shifters were significantly more conservative in the low probability condition than the low shifters (words; t(62) ¼5.20, p o.001: faces; t(62) ¼4.20, p o.001) and they were significantly more liberal in the high probability condition (words; t(62) ¼ À5.27, p o.001: faces; t(62) ¼ À7.95, p o.001). Aminoff et al. (2012) attributed this variablity between indiviudals to a willingness to make the extra effort necessary to shift a decision criterion while continuing to make a old/new judgment, a tendendcy of the individual that was consistent across both recognition tests (r ¼.581, p o.001). Therefore, individuals that were willing to shift their decision criterion in response to changes in the target probability may exhibit more extreme criterion than those that were not willing to shift, and that may be evident in their pattern of H4 CR activity as well. Fig. 5 shows the results of the tertiary split. Indeed, the top third criterion shifters showed significant H4CR activity in the low probability condition but not in the high probability condition, but the bottom third criterion shifters showed little significant activity in either condition. This suggests that when an individual shifts their criterion, more extreme criterion is applied (i.e., being more conservative), which elicited greater differential BOLD signal in H4CR due to the more extreme response bias. These results support a response bias account of the H4 CR effect.
3.2.2. Prediction 2: individual differences in the extent of the criterion would correlate with the H 4CR effect but not individual differences in d′ Up until this point, analyses have been conducted by examining group averages. The next step was to examine the relationship between the individual performance measures and the BOLD signal Fig. 3 . Whole-brain statistical parametric group average maps for the words and faces datasets, FDR corrected, q¼ .05, with N¼ 95, in both the low target probability condition when participants utilized a conservative criterion and the high target probability condition when participants utilized a liberal criterion.
Table 2
Peak activations for the H 4CR contrast (low target probability condition only). IPL ¼inferior parietal lobule; SPL ¼ superior parietal lobule; Pc ¼precuneus; IFG ¼ inferior frontal gyrus; MeFG¼ medial frontal gyrus; MFG¼ middle frontal gyrus; PoC ¼posterior cingulate; Ins ¼insula. related to H4CR. The bias account would predict that the more conservative the criterion (i.e., positive criterion) the greater the H4CR activity, whereas the memory-strength account would predict that H4CR activity would only be modulated by memory sensitivity (d′), but not criterion. As shown in Table 3 the relationship between criterion placement and H4CR activity was strongly positive in 8 out of the 11 brain regions (direct effect) in the low target probability condition above and beyond any relationship with reaction time, attention to the probability cues, and d′. The thalamus was excluded from all ROI analyses, as was the left medial parietal cortex due to the significant activity being limited to the words dataset. The three brain regions that did not show this effect were the anterior and posterior portion of the right superior parietal lobe ROI and the right medial parietal lobe. The strongest relationship between H4CR activity and criterion were observed in the right and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the left medial prefrontal cortex. These results support the response bias account and not a memory-strength account of the H4CR effect.
The bias account described in Fig. 1 would also predict a strongly negative relationship between criterion and the H4CR effect in the high probability condition. Meaning, in the high probability condition a more extreme liberal criterion would be used -which is represented by a more negative number as measured by c -and the more liberal criterion, the more biased is the "old" response, which would predict that correct rejections should elicit more BOLD signal than hits. However, instead we found a positive relationship between criterion and the H4CR effect. In the high probability condition, the more conservative the criterion the greater the H4CR activity, and this was significant above and beyond any differences in memory sensitivity in four of the ROIs (see Table 3 ). Even though group activity related to H4CR in the high probability condition was greatly attenuated in these ROIs in the whole-brain map, there was still evidence on an individual basis that more conservative criterion were related to stronger H4CR activity. This suggests that the H4CR effect might not be driven by response bias in general, but rather a response bias specifically related to the cautiousness of Fig. 4 . Increased H4 CR effect associated with using a more conservative criterion in the low probability condition for the word dataset (similar pattern of results for the faces dataset). Fig. 5 . Individuals that shifted their criteria the most between the low and high target probability conditions exhibited the most extreme criteria while individuals that shifted the least exhibited criteria close to neutral. Average criterion values for each group for each of the probability conditions are listed below the brain maps. Only those individuals who became quite conservative in the low probability condition had significant H 4CR activity.
responding "old" and not necessarily to the cautiousness of responding "new". This is a critical qualification of the bias account that will be addressed in the discussion section.
The memory-strength account of the H 4CR effect would predict that the greater the sensitivity (d′) to old items the greater the H4CR activity should be in the individual. It should be noted that individual differences in d′ (i.e., sensitivity) were significantly correlated with H4 CR activity in 5 out of the 11 brain regions in the low target probability condition, above and beyond any differences in criterion placement (see Table 3 ). This pattern would be predicted by memory strength accounts of the H 4CR effect. However, this relationship was only evident in the low target probability condition and not the high target probability condition, which would not be predicted by a memory content explanation. The interactions between criterion and sensitivity will be further explored using a trial type analysis (Section 3.2.3) in different regions associated with the H 4CR effect.
3.2.3. Prediction 3: the pattern of neural activity could be explained by the response type (i.e., "old" versus "new") and not by item history (i.e., old items versus new items)
To further understand the effects of response bias versus memory strength (and possible interactions) on the H 4 CR effect, we conducted a trial-type analysis for all possible memory trial types: hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections across the target probability conditions. Previously, we were examining the H4CR effect, which only takes into account hits and correct rejections. However, if the BOLD signal in these regions tracks with response bias, then we should see BOLD signal increase for trials that were given an "old" response regardless of whether the item was presented before, i.e., for both hits and false alarms in the low probability condition, and BOLD signal increase for trials that were given a "new" response in the high probability condition. In contrast, if the increase in activity we observe were related to memory strength, we would expect the BOLD signal to track with item history (i.e., activity greater for hits than for false alarms and activity greater for misses than for correct rejections) regardless of probability condition.
To examine this, we ran a 2 Â 2 Â 2 repeated-measures ANOVA looking at the main effects and interaction of response type ("old" or "new"), item history (old items or new items), and criterion condition (low probability or high probability) on BOLD signal in each of the 11 H4 CR ROIs listed in Table 2 (excluding the thalamus and left medial parietal cortex). The results of the ANOVA are detailed in Table 4 , which reports the effect sizes for each main effect and two-way interaction for all 11 ROIs. The three-way interactions were not significant for any ROI, and therefore are not reported. The main effect of response type was significant across all ROIs. The effects for response type were particularly robust (4.25) in the left superior parietal cortex, right superior posterior parietal cortex, left ventral prefrontal cortex, right ventral prefrontal cortex, left dorsal anterior and posterior prefrontal cortex, left anterior prefrontal cortex, and the left medial prefrontal cortex. In all 11 ROIs, there was a significant response type X probability condition interaction such that responding "old" produced significantly greater activity than responding "new" in the low probability condition but not in the high probability condition (left superior parietal ROI, F(1,94)¼34.63, po 10 . Beta values for each trial type in two representative H 4CR ROIs. For a complete set of these graphs for each ROI please see Supplemental materials. The left panel is activity from the left ventral prefrontal cortex. In the conservative condition (low target probability), the typical "successful retrieval" contrast (hits versus correct rejections, both represented by the dark gray bars) was driven by the response type ("old" or "new") and not by item history (present or not present at study). In the liberal condition (high target probability), there were no significant differences in activity between item types, which explains the lack of a H 4CR effect (represented by the light gray bars; see Table 4 for the effect sizes). The right panel illustrates H 4CR activity in the left superior parietal cortex. In this case, the H 4CR effect was driven by an interaction between response type and item history, but much more so in the conservative condition than in the liberal condition (see Table 4 for the effect sizes).
Fig. 6 illustrates these relationships across trial types in two representative ROIs, see Supplementry material for the remaining ROIs. In the left ventral prefrontal cortex, the H 4CR effect is largely driven by the "old" response in the low probability condition but not in the high probability condition. In this region, item history has no apparent effect on H 4CR activity. In the left superior parietal cortex, the relationships were more complex. In this case, the contrast between hits and correct rejections was being driven by a combination of "old" responses and previously presented items, again more so in the low probability condition than in the high probability condition. The effect of item history on activity in this region indicates that memory content may be contributing to H 4CR activity in select brain regions in limited conditions (low target probability but not in a high target probability condition), suggesting that memory orienting (O'Connor et al., 2010; Jaeger et al., 2013) may be playing a role in H4 CR activity within these regions. However, the overall pattern of activity across trial types and across all regions of the H 4CR effect strongly suggests that activity was mainly being driven by "old" responses in a conservative state of mind.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to determine the extent to which brain activity associated with H4CR could be accounted for by the maintenance of a response bias rather than memory strength as measured by sensitivity. This large-scale fMRI study (95 participants) took advantage of the wide variance between individuals in criterion placement and memory strength on two recognition tests that included shifts in target probability. Overall, we had three key findings: (1) a significant portion of the brain activity associated with the H4CR effect could be accounted for by individual differences in the conservativeness of the decision criterion above and beyond individual differences in memory strength; (2) many regions of the H4CR effect showed a main effect of response type (greater activity for responding "old" than for responding "new") rather than item history in the low probability condition only; and (3) individual differences in memory strength could also account for a significant portion of the brain activity in several parietal regions associated with H 4CR, but again, only in the low probability condition. We suggest that these findings indicate that much of the brain activity during "successful retrieval" is actually due to the cautiousness, or conservativeness, of the recognition judgment. The current study used a memory paradigm that varied the probability that the test item was previously studied in order to test whether the response bias or memory strength could account for the H4CR effect. The paradigm was specifically designed to induce many trials in which the participant's criterion shifted in response to changes in target probability and to facilitate criterion shifting by making the discrimination between old and new items difficult, yielding relatively low d′ values (see Aminoff et al., 2012 , for a full account of the behavioral results). When the probability of a target shifts, the new probability is subsequently incorporated into the recognition judgment. This entails updating the decision rule used for determining whether an item was previously studied. Assuming the goal is to maximize correct responses, when the decision is uncertain and the probability of previous item occurrence is high, a rule should designate more items as old, and when the probability is low, a rule should designate more items as new (Green and Swets, 1966; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005; Aminoff et al., 2012) .
H4 CR activity tracks with the cautiousness of the recognition response
The results of this study demonstrated that the activity associated with the H 4CR contrast could be accounted for, to a large extent, by the conservativeness of a decision criterion. Although the H4 CR effect is commonly associated with the memory strength of successfully recognized old items compared to correctly rejected new items, we found that these activations were more sensitive to changes in decision criterion than to changes in memory strength. For instance, we found that many regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortex that demonstrated significant H4CR activity in the low probability condition, were not significantly active in the high probability condition of the same participants. Critically, this could not be accounted for by differences in d′ between the two conditions. We also found in our multiple regression that individual differences in the conservativeness of the criterion was significantly related to increases in the activity of each region associated with the H4CR effect. More importantly, the variance in brain activity accounted for by conservativeness was above and beyond the variance accounted for by any difference in reaction time, attention to the probability cues, or memory sensitivity. Our finding that the H4CR effect depends, to a large extent, on the conservativeness of a decision criterion cannot be accounted for by a memory strength account of the H4CR effect (as shown in Fig. 1) . However, the finding also cannot be accounted for by a pure response bias account either, since the effect of response type occurred in the low probability condition (i.e., "old" responses eliciting greater activity than "new" responses) but not in the high probability condition (i.e., "new" responses eliciting greater activity than "old" responses).
If the H4 CR effect is based entirely on biasing a particular response in a probability condition, then one might expect more activity for "old" responses than "new" response in the low probability condition, and more activity for "new" responses than "old" responses in the high probability condition. While we found that predicted pattern in the low probability condition, we did not find that predicted pattern in the high probability condition. In fact, we found that the average activity in the H4 CR effect across all participants was insensitive to either the response type or the item history in the liberal condition. Furthermore, in the analysis of individual differences, we found that the more conservative the participant was in the high probability condition, the more their pattern of brain activity resembled the pattern of activity in the low probability condition, i.e., more activity for "old" responses than for "new" responses. Therefore, we suggest that the effect observed was not necessarily due to working against any particular response bias, as suggested by a pure bias account (Fig. 1) , but was due to participants being cautious to respond "old" on a recognition test.
Why would the H4CR effect track with being cautious in only one direction -in making an "old" response, and not a "new" response? We predicted that in a condition with a low probability of a target participants would be cautious to respond "old" in order to avoid false alarms, but we also predicted that in a condition with a high probability of a target participants would be equally cautious to respond "new" in order to avoid misses. However, the pattern of brain activity that we observed suggests that the H 4CR effect only tracks with the cautiousness of the participants to avoid false alarms on a memory test. We suggest this is because the cognitive control engaged when being cautious about making an "old" response is different than that which is engaged when being cautious about making a "new" response. A liberal decision criterion allows the participants to be lenient or lax about responding "old," -and therefore participants can respond "old" to any sense of oldness or familiarity in the test items. This requires less cognitive control since the participant just needs any sense of familiarity to make a decision that is in line with target probabilities. In contrast, a conservative criterion forces the participant to critically evaluate any evidence of familiarity since it is likely that the item is new. This is particularly difficult given that familiarity to previously encountered items is a potent and automatic response, and even new items will be normally distributed along some strength of familiarity axis, i.e., some new items will seem more familiar than others due to encounters and associations outside of the study context (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1997) . Unlike the perceptual discrimination of targets and distractors, the recognition discrimination of targets and distractors must deal with varying levels of familiarity. To avoid a false alarm, one must resist the urge to respond to familiarity. To avoid a miss, one must simply go with the urge to respond to familiarity. This difference in the cognitive control of responding to familiarity, in particular, may be the underlying nature of the H4CR effect.
If the underlying processes of the H 4CR effect were related to the cognitive control required when being cautious about making an old response, this would account for why the conservativeness of the criterion would track closely with the H4 CR effect regardless of the probability condition. As shown in Table 3 , we observed that the conservativeness of the decision criterion accounted for the H4 CR effect above and beyond d′ and other factors not only in the low probability condition but also in the high probability condition. Interestingly, averaged across all participants there were no BOLD differences found between hits and correct rejections (in either direction) in the high probability condition. As a group, the criterion was generally lax enough, such that cautiousness of an old response was not employed, yielding the H 4CR effect completely attenuated. Critically, however, some participants were still more conservative than others, and those participants showed an increased H4CR effect in the same brain regions that were present in the low probability condition.
An explanation based on a cautious state of mind would converge with much of the decision-making literature showing that sustained cognitive control activates similar regions of the prefrontal cortex and dorsolateral regions of the parietal cortex (Banich et al., 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Gruber et al., 2002; Braver et al., 2003; Niendam et al., 2012) . In other words, being cautious to respond "old" on a recognition test may be similar to the incongruent condition of the Stroop task, i.e., responding "red" to the word GREEN when that word is colored red. Braver (2012) describes this as a proactive control process that reflects sustained and anticipatory maintenance of goal-relevant information that is needed to optimize performance. Badre and Wagner (2007) suggested that these frontoparietal regions could operate on retrieved information to fit with decision criteria and response contingencies. Barredo et al. (2013) recently mapped out a pathway from the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to the medial temporal lobe using a source-monitoring task that demonstrated how these prefrontal regions could control the sense of "oldness" that comes with episodic memory retrieval. However, the link between cautiousness to respond "old" on a recognition test and cognitive control mechanisms based on the brain regions that were activated must be qualified by the fact that we did not collect any direct measures of cognitive control. Hopefully, future studies can make this link more explicit.
Natural response tendency of the participant
It is possible that the effects we observed in this study were attenuated by the natural tendencies of our participants. For example, if our participants tended to be liberal, then placing them in a conservative condition in which they now have to be cautious to respond "old" may have been more effortful for them than it would be for participants that tended to be conservative. In other words, participants that are normally cautious in their recognition responses may not show the reported effects. Previous studies have reported that individuals seem to have a natural bias on recognition tests with neutral criterion conditions (e.g., 50/50 target ratio) that appears to be stable across a variety of tasks (Kantner and Lindsay, 2012 ). While we did not have a neutral condition in this study to measure participants' natural tendencies, we did indeed find that, as reported in Aminoff et al. (2012) , that participants tended to be slightly more liberal in the high probability condition (C ¼ À.32 for the word stimuli and C ¼ À.31 for the face stimuli) than conservative in the low probability condition (C ¼ þ.30 for the word stimuli and C ¼ þ.28 for the face stimuli). But that difference was quite small and may be due to some extreme liberal values in a small number of participants. In fact, an examination of the individuals within that study showed that they tended to skew more conservative than liberal for both recognition tests. Therefore, we believe these effects would be observed regardless of the natural tendencies of the participants, but to test this explicitly additional studies are needed.
Another stable tendency, however, that did have a noticeable effect on the results we report was the general tendency to shift a criterion between conditions (see Aminoff et al., 2012) . Some participants shifted their criterion appropriately from one extreme to another, while other participants did not shift at all. Aminoff et al. (2012) explained this difference as a willingness to make the extra effort to adapt their decision criterion. The spread of decision criterion employed by participants who did not shift were equally conservative as they were liberal. However, we did find that if we split the participants into tertiary groups based on criterion shifting, participants with the lowest criterion shift scores did not show any attenuation of the H 4CR effect between the high or low probability conditions (see Fig. 5 ). We see this as further evidence that the H4CR effect reflects the cautiousness of the recognition response: regardless of the participants' natural tendency to be liberal or conservative on a recognition test, these particular participants were not responding to changes in the target probability. Therefore, they were not being any more cautious to respond "old" in the low target probability condition than they were in the high target probability condition, and this is reflected in their measures of criterion (see Fig. 5 ). This analysis further demonstrated that the H4CR effect was significantly affected by the willingness or ability of the individual to become cautious to respond "old", beyond their natural tendency, on a recognition test.
Most neuroimaging studies of recognition memory do not attempt to manipulate criterion placement and often include experimental designs, such as a 50/50 target/distractor ratio, that should lead to a neutral bias. Yet these studies still report robust H4CR activity in parietal and prefrontal regions . However, it is difficult to know the actual criterion used by participants in these studies, despite the neutral designs, since criterion measures are rarely reported. It may be that participants are typically cautious to make "old" judgments even when the target probability is 50%, and they may be particularly cautious on a recognition test while having their brain scanned (Gutchess and Park, 2006) . For example, in a Herron et al. (2004) study that varied target probability to examine the saliency of targets, the condition with a 50/50 target ratio actually produced more conservative responses (Br¼.40) than the condition with a 25/75 target ratio (Br¼ .49). It is also not clear whether a criterion measure of zero is necessarily the absence of caution. For example, a measure of zero criterion may indicate that participants are as likely to avoid misses as they are to avoid false alarms, but is that still enough caution to produce a H4 CR effect? More systematic studies will be needed to explore these parameters and its effects on H 4CR activity.
Memory strength and the "successful retrieval" effect
With regard to a memory strength account of the H4 CR effect, several previous studies have shown H4CR activity that is significantly modulated by the subjective memory experience (e.g., activity for false alarms is greater than misses) (Wheeler and Buckner, 2003; Kahn et al., 2004) ; recollection or familiarity (Henson et al., 1999; Wheeler and Buckner, 2004) , the repetition of studied items (Guerin and Miller, 2011) , and individual differences in confidence ratings (Yonelinas et al., 2005; Montaldi et al., 2006) . Criss et al. (2013) recently showed separate regions of H4 CR activity, some that are correlated with individual differences in criterion (c) and not d′, and other regions with the opposite relationship. However, as Jaeger et al. (2013) demonstrated, the relationship with d′ can be illusory. Other cognitive processes can become more engaged as the memory strength increases, including an unexpected familiarity response that increases with increased accuracy. We observed a similar effect such that there was a significant relationship between the H 4CR effect and individual differences in d′ above and beyond c, but only in the conservative, low probability condition. If the H4CR effect truly represents memory content as measured by d′, then one would expect that relationship to be significant above and beyond other cognitive factors such as criterion and to hold across criterion conditions. At the very least, any study that examines individual differences in brain activity needs to have a large enough sample size to carry out regression analyses that can account for possible interactions, individual differences and spurious correlations.
It should be noted that, given our participants' relatively low discrimination between old and new items, that several studies using higher discrimination levels suggest that regions of the lateral parietal cortex more ventral to those reported here are sensitive to the amount of information recollected, including source information related to recollection and strong familiarity responses (Vilberg and Rugg, 2008; Uncapher et al., 2010; Elman et al., 2013; Frithsen and Miller, 2014) . Guerin and Miller (2011) manipulated the frequency of studied items (1, 2, 8, or 9 times) and did not find activity in any brain region that was modulated by the accumulated evidence of a frequency judgment (e.g., which of two studied items was presented more frequently?), but that a region of the angular gyrus was modulated linearly by the absolute frequency of the studied items in a frequency judgment. While H4CR effects in more ventral portions of the angular gyrus and the supramarginal gyrus may be more directly linked to memory content and less susceptible to criterion effects, this needs to be tested more directly in the future. Indeed, we found that when we directly compared the low probability condition to the high probability condition, the activations extended more ventrally into the angular gyrus.
Previous studies of probability manipulation in recognition memory tests
Previous studies have manipulated the probability mixture of targets in order to observe the effect on activity associated with H4CR (Herron et al., 2004; Vilberg and Rugg, 2009; O'Connor et al., 2010; Jaeger et al., 2013) . A report by Herron et al. (2004) and a subsequent report by Vilberg and Rugg (2009) manipulated the ratio of old/new items (either 75/25% or 25/75%) on a recognition test. They reasoned that regions responsive to familiarity and recollection should not be sensitive to the saliency of targets through changes in the target ratios. Indeed, they found that many regions of the lateral parietal and prefrontal cortex showed an interaction between target ratio and "successful retrieval," except for one region in the middle portion of the IPS that was not sensitive to target ratio, suggesting that it may indeed be sensitive to familiarity. However, our study showed that this same region in the IPS was sensitive to changes in target probability.
A critical difference between the Herron et al. (2004) and the Vilberg and Rugg (2009) studies and our study has to do with the behavioral effect of changing target probabilities. As we reported, changing the target probability significantly affected criterion (high old/new ratio c¼ À.31, low old/new ratio c ¼ þ.28 for words), whereas in the Vilberg and Rugg (2009) study the changes in target probability had no significant effect on response bias (high old/new ratio Br¼.47, low old/new ratio Br¼.36). One difference is that participants in their study made a source judgment, while participants in our study made an item judgment. Alternatively, the lack of effect in the Vilberg and Rugg (2009) may also be due in part to the instructions they gave the participants. They specifically instructed the participants to respond to the test items on the basis of their memory for the item and to not make any guesses based on the apparent ratio of old/new items. Further, they did not explicitly cue the participants when changes occurred in the target ratios. Conscious awareness of target probability significantly affects the degree to which participants will shift their criterion (Estes and Maddox, 1995; Rhodes and Jacoby, 2007) . Indeed, we found that the more participants were able to do this, the more H4CR activity occurred in regions along the IPS. Even though Vilberg and Rugg (2009) did not find the middle portion of the IPS sensitive to differences in the target ratios, the overall conservativeness of the decision criterion could, nevertheless, have been driving the H4 CR activation if participants were equally conservative in both conditions regardless of the changes in target probability, as indicated by their behavioral results.
As discussed in the introduction, two other studies manipulated the probability mixture of targets, but in these cases did so on a trial-by-trial basis by cueing the participants prior to each test item as to whether the test item is likely old or likely new in order to test the effect on H4CR activity (O'Connor et al., 2010; Jaeger et al., 2013 ). The authors reasoned that H 4CR effects, particularly in lateral parietal cortex and prefrontal regions, reflect an orienting response similar to spatial orienting (Posner et al., 1980) and not a response due to processing the representation of mnemonic content. If a participant were expecting a new item on a test trial, then responding "old" to an old item would necessarily violate that expectation. They found that activity in the dorsal anterior angular gyrus, left lateral premotor, and anterior prefrontal cortex was greater for hits than correct rejections when the participants were expecting new items, but no difference between these conditions when they were expecting old items. Thus, a "hit" would represent a violation of an expected new item. Critical to their hypothesis, they also found the opposite pattern in separate regions, most notably in left anterior intraparietal sulcus and postcentral gyrus, i.e., greater activity for correct rejections than for hits when expecting old items but not when expecting new items. Based on these results, the authors suggest that H 4CR activity during a recognition test is associated with participants orienting toward unexpected novelty or familiarity in the environment.
Both the memory orienting account (Jaeger et al., 2013 ) and a cautiousness to respond "old" account of the H4CR effect would make the same prediction that higher BOLD signal would arise for hits than for correct rejections when using a conservative decision criterion (when test items are more likely to be new), but only the memory orienting account would predict higher BOLD signal for correct rejections than for hits when using a liberal decision criterion (when test items are more likely to be old). Another critical difference, though, between the two accounts is that the orienting account would predict a significant interaction with memory strength, and a cautiousness to respond "old" account would not. The memory orienting model depends on the ability to distinguish between old and new items. If it were difficult to distinguish between the two, then neither of the item types would be a violation of the expectancy that might be established by the probability cues. In fact, the Jaeger et al. (2013) study demonstrated that the expectancy violation response (in the likely new condition, i.e., unexpected familiarity) was significantly related to individual differences in d′. In our study, however, the H4CR effect was quite robust in the likely new condition even though the overall d′ was relatively low. We found that individual differences in the conservativeness of the criterion could account for variance in the H4CR effect above and beyond any variance accounted for by differences in d′, supporting the response bias account. Furthermore, we found several regions of the prefrontal cortex that were sensitive to the response types within the conservative condition, but were not sensitive to the presentation history of the test items (Fig. 6) . Thus, BOLD signal was similarly high for hits and false alarms, where the response was "old", compared with the trials where the response was "new" (i.e., misses and correct rejections). Further, H4CR activity in these prefrontal regions (except for the left anterior prefrontal cortex) were not significantly related to individual differences in d′. This would not be predicted by the memory orienting account. Although most of the parietal regions of the H4CR effect interacted with memory strength in the low target probability condition, almost all of the prefrontal cortex regions did not. We suggest that all regions of the H4CR effect are sensitive to caution to respond "old" on a recognition test that relies mostly on familiarity to make the discrimination, while the parietal regions of the H4CR effect may also be sensitive to a memory orienting response that is dependent on the level of sensitivity.
Conclusion
Identifying a reliable neural marker of H4 CR activity that is unambiguously due to criterion versus one that is unambiguously due to memory evidence could be enormously useful to recognition memory research. As Criss et al. (2013) recently demonstrated with the strength-based mirror effect, such neural markers could be used to adjudicate the source of several memory phenomena that currently cannot be resolved using behavioral measures alone. However, most studies examining the H4CR effects do not take into account measures of criterion. As we have demonstrated in this study, large portions of the H4 CR effect may reflect a cautious approach to a recognition decision and not the successful output of episodic retrieval. This finding suggests that mechanisms associated decision criterion must be taken into account when exploring the psychological and neural mechanisms that mediate recognition memory. This study provides a foundation for examining the role of decision criterion in memory retrieval, which will aid in the exploration of memory retrieval, memory strategies, and optimal decision making.
